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Abstract
Insurgency and guerrilla warfare impose enormous socio-economic costs and
often persist for decades. The opacity of such forms of conict is often an
obstacle to eective international humanitarian intervention and development
programs. To shed light on the internal organization of otherwise unknown
insurgent groups, this paper proposes two methodologies for the detection of
unobserved coalitions of militant factions in conict areas, and studies their
main determinants. Our approach is parsimonious and based on daily geocoded
incident-level data on insurgent attacks alone. We provide applications to the
Afghan conict during the 2004-2009 period and to Pakistan during the 2008-
2011 period, identifying systematically dierent coalition structures. Further
applications are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Among many political sources of welfare loss, few compare in magnitude to mili-
tary conict and, in the post World War II period in particular, to the losses ascribed
to civil war and violent insurgency [O'Neill, 1990]. Insurgency, dened as armed re-
bellion against a central authority1, is also one of the most opaque forms of conict.
Intertwining connections with the population blur the lines between combatants and
civilians [Kilcullen, 2009]. The relative strength and even the identity of potential
negotiating counterparties are often unclear, and in the words of Fearon [2008] \there
are no clear front lines." Such forms of conict have disproportionately aected poor
countries and are gaining central status in the literature on the political economy of
development [Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Berman and Matanock 2015]. Our paper
oers a contribution to the economic analysis of these irregular wars that is both
methodological and empirical.
Theoretically, we propose a set of approaches aimed at estimating the latent in-
ternal organization of multiple insurgent groups. Motivating our interest in this
particular problem is uncontrived. Take the case of Syria after 2011. Lack of knowl-
edge about the organization of the anti-Assad insurgency and the structure of cross-
alliances among militant groups emerged as a crucial obstacle to targeted Western
military action and a deterrent to humanitarian relief intervention in the Syrian civil
war [Jenkins, 2014]. The political risks of supporting anti-regime rebels (possibly
aligned with radical Islamist movements) were deemed too high. In this backdrop, to
February 2016, the Syrian conict alone displaced 10:7 million civilians and caused
the death of over 250; 000 individuals according to the United Nations Oce for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs [United Nations, 2016].
Empirically, we focus on the costly insurgencies of Afghanistan and Pakistan2.
On the U.S. side alone, Afghan operations cost the lives of more than 1; 800 troops
between 2001 and 2011, and led to more than $444 billion in military expenses.3
1According to O'Neill [1990] \Insurgency may be dened as a struggle between a nonruling group
and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g.,
organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or
sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics."
2Unfortunately, we are not aware of suitable data for Syria. In Section 5 we further discuss the
case cases of Iraq, Syria, and Libya, all instances where our methodologies could be potentially of
use.
3Soon into the operation, the U.S. military acknowledged through a drastic adjustment in tac-
tics that the Afghan conict diered substantially from previous large-scale military operations.
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Statistics for Afghan civilians appear less certain, but the adverse eects are painfully
obvious even to the casual observer. In Pakistan, a perduring eort in placating
nationalist, militant, and sectarian-related insurgencies has been accompanied by a
heavy toll of 18; 583 people killed and 19; 356 injured between 2012 and 2015 alone
[Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2016, p.8]. This eort has diverted valuable resources
from aid and development assistance programs and public goods provision in the
country.
As an more concrete example, consider the case of Afghanistan specically. The
insurgency during 2004-2009 has been approximately described as originating from an
alliance between the Afghan Taliban insurgents and al-Qaeda foreign ghters against
the Afghan government and the supporting international coalition forces. While this
was surely a facet of this early phase, front lines were uncertain and the unity of the
insurgents doubtful. Importantly, policymakers disagree about whether the Taliban
were a unied ghting organization, or rather an umbrella coalition of heterogeneous
forces. Some were skeptical of the degree of control that Taliban leader Mullah Mo-
hammed Omar exerted over the powerful Haqqani faction and the Dadullah network.4
Similarly, the Hizb-i Islami faction was considered by many a separate entity from
the Taliban proper.5
Other observers promoted an opposite view. In an insightful qualitative essay
Dorronsoro [2009] states: \The Taliban are often described as an umbrella movement
comprising loosely connected groups that are essentially local and unorganized. On the
contrary, this report's analysis of the structure and strategy of the insurgency reveals a
resilient adversary, engaged in strategic planning and coordinated action."6 Evidence
Appendix A includes a reference time line for conict events in Afghanistan.
4For example, the UN report [2013] stated that \Despite what passes for a zonal command
structure across Afghanistan, the Taliban have shown themselves unwilling or unable to monopolize
anti-State violence. The persistent presence and autonomy of the Haqqani Network and the man-
ner in which other, non-Taliban, groupings like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba are operating in Afghanistan
raises questions about the true extent of the inuence exerted by the Taliban leadership." Brahimi
[2010] reports a statement by Ashraf Ghani, current Afghan president, in a lecture for the Miliband
Programme at LSE indicating \The Taliban are not a unied force - they are not the SPLA in Sudan
or the Maoists in Nepal" while Giustozzi [2009] states that \The Taliban themselves are not fully
united and the insurgency is not limited to the Taliban."
5Fotini and Semple [2009] state explicitly that \the Taliban is not a unied or monolithic move-
ment" and Thruelsen [2010] that \the movement should not be seen as a unied hierarchical actor
that can be dealt with as part of a generic approach covering the whole of Afghanistan."See also
Giustozzi [2007].
6In contrast, the Pakistani Taliban are described in the same essay as an umbrella organization
that is clearly non-unitary.
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in support of this position includes the existence of the Layha (a centralized code of
conduct for Mujahidin), as well as the strong centralizing tendencies of the Obedience
to the Amir (a manual endorsed by Mullah Omar).7
This disagreement among experts is unsettling. Understanding the extent of ter-
ritorial control and population support of insurgent groups is essential for military
operations. Furthermore, knowledge of the internal organization and cohesion of
rebel groups could have been used to prevent selective violence by insurgents, and
ultimately help with the relief and reconstruction of areas aected by conict.8
This paper shows how the covariance structure of data on violent events can be
used to estimate the number of dierent active insurgent groups and their territories
of inuence, features that are typically unobservable to the econometrician. In this
particular application we make use of the specic covariance structure emerging from
the fact that insurgent groups with the ability to launch simultaneous and geograph-
ically separated attacks generally appear to do so. This relies on the conclusions of
the existing literature regarding the incentives for organized violent groups to launch
coordinated attack in multiple locations. For instance, Deloughery [2013] provides a
recent review of this literature and presents systematic evidence of the advantages
of simultaneous attacks for terrorist organizations in terms of media coverage and
appeal in the recruitment of new ghters {incentives that operate within insurgencies
as well.9
7These are available in English translation as Munir [2011] and Ludhianvi [2015], respectively.
8One example of the importance of understanding insurgent group structures for post-conict
negotiations comes from Colombia. The recent appearance of the Bandas Criminales Emergentes
(BACRIM) in lieu of the AUC paramilitary combatants has been a central issue in the work of
Colombia's Reconciliation Commission in deploying resources and rebuilding state institutions and
control at the local level.
9From a western perspective, the 9/11 attacks in the United States are the most obvious example
of the salience of such simultaneous violence, but the phenomenon is widespread. For example, in
southern Thailand insurgent movements have adopted similar tactics: \On April 28, 2004 groups of
militants gathered at mosques in Yala, Pattani, and Songkhla provinces before conducting simul-
taneous attacks on security checkpoints, police stations and army bases" [Fernandes, 2008]. The
Indian Mujahideen, responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, typically carry out simultaneous at-
tacks [Subrahmanian et al., 2013]. Kurdish nationalists and the Tamil Tigers are known to have
adopted simultaneous attacks as a strategy. In Africa, Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has carried
out coordinated attacks on multiple targets such as churches, and Anderson [1974] describes coordi-
nated attacks in Portuguese colonies. Simultaneous attacks and suicides have been a trademark of
international jihadist organizations and of al-Qaeda in particular, making our approach well-suited
to the Afghan insurgency case. Because the empirical covariance matrix of attacks is observed, these
assumptions implying positive covariances driven by co-occurring incidents are readily veriable and
they are in fact supported by the data. See discussion in Section 2.
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We take these incentives as given, and assume that an organization with the
capability of launching such attacks will choose to do so. The covariance of the
attacks that are observed in excess to simple random correlation can thus be employed
to analyze the underlying structure of the insurgent groups organization. Attacks
across dierent locations on the same day are assumed either as the result of random
chance or to represent an insurgent group with a presence in those locations. A
transparent structural model of attacks is used to distinguish between random chance
and organized group behavior. After estimating the number of dierent guerrilla
groups and their territorial extent, we assess the main empirical determinants of
insurgent presence and produce an analysis of shifts in insurgent presence over time.
The paper addresses three main questions. First, when faced with multiple violent
incidents in multiple regions, how can one decide whether the simultaneous incidents
observed are isolated idiosyncratic events, as opposed to organized attacks by coali-
tions of assailants? Second, how can one identify from incident data alone how many
distinct insurgent groups (if any) are attacking? Third, what are the socioeconomic
determinants driving the diusion and segmentation of the rebels within a specic
region and across regions?
The estimation method models a country experiencing an insurgency as a set
of points at which violent incidents can occur in each period. Each point in this
set represents the centroid of an administrative district and each period is one day.
Attacks on the same day in two dierent districts will occur with greater-than-random
frequency if the same insurgent group is operating in both areas. Using a variety
of assumptions regarding what the \reference" cross-district covariance in attacks
would be in the case where there were no organized groups, we calculate which sets
of districts are more correlated than would be expected by chance alone. In general,
these districts will be ones that have repeatedly experienced simultaneous attacks. We
then use this information to estimate the cluster of districts in which each guerrilla
group operates.
We present estimators that allow for a single district to be contested by multiple
guerrilla groups or by a single group, or by none. The estimators provide the number
of guerrilla groups operating, the geographic area of each of these, and the intensity
of each group's activity in each district. Let us emphasize that the methods we
present can accommodate slow-moving trends in violence over time and are robust
to aggregate shocks (e.g. weather, seasonality, or U.S. troop movements) that might
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aect insurgent activity in many areas simultaneously.
In order to provide our estimates, the data generating process used to model the
occurrence of violent incidents is somewhat stylized. The partial loss of generality
has to be traded o with the parsimony necessary due to the lack of any detailed data
on the internal organization and planning strategies of insurgent forces.
The main empirical results of the paper are as follows. We conclude that for the
early period 2004-2009 insurgent activity in Afghanistan is best represented by a single
organized group, rather than several independent groups, and that the extent of this
group is largely determined by ethnic boundaries. This result is probed by partialling
out slow-moving trends and spurious correlation induced by large-scale U.S. military
activity, to constraining the analysis to districts with a number of incidents above
specic thresholds, and to limiting the analysis to incidents explicitly claimed by the
Taliban.
We also conduct an in-depth analysis of the Pakistani insurgency (which includes
the Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), using multiple
data sets for the period 2008-2011. Interestingly, the TTP are completely separate
from their Afghan counterparts and unanimously considered an umbrella coalition
of diverse violent actors.10 We show that in the case of Pakistan, our methodology
detects multiple insurgent groups (four, in fact) and is completely consistent with the
extant qualitative literature on insurgency in Pakistan.
We also consider changes in the extent of the Afghan Taliban over two time
periods: 2004-2007 compared to 2008-2009. We nd that insurgents spread largely
to districts adjacent to those where they were already present: this is sometimes
described as an \oil spot" strategy.11 We also nd that there has been penetration
by the insurgents into areas traditionally occupied by non-Pashtun ethnic groups.
We nish by discussing several case studies outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan
where application of the methodologies we present could be helpful in assessing the
economics of post-conict reconstruction and power sharing with former insurgent
groups from Latin America, Asia, and Africa.
An increasing amount of attention has been devoted within the elds of develop-
ment economics and political economy to the study of armed conict within countries,
10Dorronsoro [2009] discusses how\The Pakistani Taliban have dierent structures, dierent lead-
ers, and a dierent social base [relative to the Afghan Taliban -AN]. They are, in fact, an umbrella
movement comprising loosely connected groups."
11See Krepinevich [2005] for the relevance of this approach in Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces.
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in particular civil wars and insurgency. Economists have been interested in the anal-
ysis of violence and conict at least as far back as Schelling [1960] and Tullock [1974],
with Hirshleifer [1991, 1995a, 1995b, 2001] and Grossman [1991, 2002] oering more
recent theoretical contributions. Outside of Economics the interest has been even
greater: Political scientists have dedicated to the study of conict a substantial part
of their work in the eld of International Relations.
Political Science and Economics have provided some of the most recent and novel
insights in the study of insurgency.12 As underlined by Blattman and Miguel [2010],
a remarkable characteristic of this recent wave of research has been a strong empirical
bend and an increasing attention to micro-level (typically incident-level) information.
The use of geocoded micro data in this area is a departure from more established
\macro" empirical approaches, which were based on country level information or
aggregate conict information.13
This paper is one in the new \micro" style, with a specic emphasis on the anal-
ysis of insurgency and small wars. Economic and statistical evidence on the role of
anti-government guerrilla activities is still sparse, even though such activities cause
substantial damage worldwide and appear from a quantitative perspective to be the
predominant form conict in civil wars since 1945 [Fearon, 2008; Ghobarah et al.,
2003]. Insurgents' strategies are generally not well understood, and neither are the
subtleties of their interactions with the noncombatant population [Gutierrez-Sanin,
2008; Kilcullen, 2009]. A particular incentive for further study is that insurgent activ-
ity is also often linked to terrorist activities, and thus there is a connection with the
growing literature on the economics of terrorism [Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson,
2007; Benmelech, Berrebi, Klor, 2012].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our
methodology for the estimation of coalition structures among insurgent groups. We
describe our data in Section 3, particularly the incident-level data for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, which have been generously made available by the Empirical Studies
Of Conict (ESOC) project. The analysis of the determinants of insurgent group
presence is developed in Section 4. Section 5 presents several case studies focused
on the economic importance of understanding insurgent organization in conict and
12These include Berman [2009], Berman et al. [2011], Condra et al. [2010], Blair et al. [2012],
Condra and Shapiro [2012], Callen and Weidmann [2013], and Bueno de Mesquita [2013].
13Notable instances of the \macro" approach include Fearon and Laitin [2003], Boix [2008], Collier
and Hoeer [2004], and Collier and Rohner [2008], among many others.
6
post-conict environments in developing countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We are interested in estimating parameters describing the presence and identity of
organized insurgent groups in each of many districts in a country, and also the total
number of such insurgent groups active in the country. We do not propose a complete
theory of insurgent activity. Instead, we develop a parsimonious econometric model
based on assumptions regarding insurgent behavior. This approach is motivated
by both lack of data on opaque insurgency organization and by the computational
diculties involved in estimating models of the type considered; these diculties
appear to preclude consideration of all but the simplest structural models.
We rst present a model of insurgent behavior that links insurgent presence to en-
tries in the cross-district covariance matrix of insurgent attacks. Next, we discuss how
to decompose this covariance matrix into a form useful for estimation. We then de-
scribe two estimation approaches based on this model: the rst assumes that exactly
one insurgent group is present in each district, while the second relaxes this assump-
tion. We conclude by explaining how we can avoid potential bias from long-term
trends in attacks across districts. Avoiding bias from weather, seasonal uctuations,
and other such trends is important when applying our approach to actual data, but
we discuss these details last in order to simplify the exposition of the model.
2.1 Insurgent Attacks
Let districts be indexed by i, and let there be a total of N districts in which attacks
occur. Violent occurrences in i can be of two types: unorganized or organized by an
insurgent group. We make a distinction between attacks initiated by unorganized
local militants and those initiated by members of an organized group because we also
allow for the possibility that there are no organized insurgent groups present in a
district even though attacks are observed there.
Let `i be the number of unorganized local militants in district i. Let organized
insurgent groups be indexed by j, and let J be the total number of such organized
groups active anywhere in the country. Let ij be the number of members in district
i belonging to organized group j. Time is discrete and indexed by t. In our analysis
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below, the time periods used will be days. This relatively high-frequency attack data
is useful because it reduces the number of attacks that are simultaneous simply by
random chance.
In each time period, the probability that an unorganized local militant launches an
attack is , which does not change across time (this assumption is relaxed in Section
2.5). The decision by unorganized militants to attack is independent of the decision
of anyone else (unorganized militant or group member). The expected number of
attacks by local militants in district i at time t is thus `i, and the variance within
district i is (1  )`i. The covariance in these attacks between two districts i and i0
is zero: the attack decisions are made independently, and the probability of an attack
is constant.
In contrast to unorganized militants, members of an organized group are more
likely to attack on some particular days than on others. Let jt be the probability
that a member of group j will attack at time t. This probability is the same for
all members of group j, and whether any given member attacks is independent of
other attack decisions after conditioning on the attack probability jt. Across time,
the covariance of attacks between two members of the same group is thus Var(j).
We assume that this variance is constant across groups, and will refer to it as 2.
Assume that for any other group j0, jt is uncorrelated with j0t. Thus, the covariance
of attacks between two members of dierent groups is zero. This orthogonality is an
important identifying assumption of the model and follows the standard approach in
the factor analysis literature.
Consider the members of group j. If there are ij members in district i and i0j
members in district i0, then the covariance in attacks over time between these two
districts, due to the presence of members of group j, is iji0j
2. Summing over
members of all groups, the covariance in attacks between districts i and i0 will beP
j iji0j
2.
The model just presented is clearly a stylized model of the attack behavior of
insurgent groups, and the covariance structure imposed is not without loss of gen-
erality. A particularly strong assumption made in the model is that the members
of an insurgent group do not move between districts: a given group j has a certain
membership ij in district i, and those members will either be encouraged to attack
in a given period (a high jt), or not (low jt).
A very dierent model would be one in which members of an insurgent group
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are mobile, and in any given period have the choice of attacking in one of many
districts. This latter model implies that organized groups should lead to negative
covariances between districts, as insurgent group members who attack in district i
could not also be attacking in district i0 in the same period. In contrast, the model
presented above suggests that this covariance should be positive if the same insurgent
group j has members in both i and i0, as attacks in both i and i0 will be higher in
periods when jt is high and lower in periods when jt is low. In the data used, the
observed covariances are systematically positive, validating our main assumption.14
The qualitative research of Deloughery [2013] and others, as discussed in Section 1,
also suggests that a model without substantial substitution in attacks across districts
appears most appropriate.
2.2 Covariance Decomposition
Let   be the covariance matrix for attacks discussed in Section 2.1, where the
entry in row i and column i0 gives the covariance in attacks across time for these two
districts. Analysis will be based on this matrix, and others created from it.15
The covariance matrix   can be decomposed as
(1)   =  D +  L;
where  D is a diagonal matrix and  L is a low rank matrix of the form
(2)  L = 
2
26666664
P
j 1j1j
P
j 1j2jP
j 2j1j
P
j 2j2j
:::
P
j ijijP
j ij1j :::
P
j iji0j
:::
37777775
This decomposition is considered because the diagonal entries of the covariance
matrix are a sum of variance from unorganized militants and variance from organized
14Permutation tests of the sort discussed later indicate that the mean covariance is positive at any
reasonable condence level. Results available upon request.
15This specication is similar to the \random ock" of Bottegal and Picci [2015], except that an
attack either happens or does not in each case, and this is observed, rather than the underlying
probability being observed.
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groups, and only the latter is of interest.16 As a normalization, we set 2 = 1.
Let ii0 =
P
j iji0j denote the o-diagonal entry on row i and column i
0 of  L.
Let ii0 be the corresponding entry of the covariance matrix in the observed sample.
Unfortunately, no empirical counterpart to  L is observed, and thus one will have to
be created by modifying the diagonal of the observed covariance matrix  .
To create a  ^L from  , a diagonal matrix  ^D will be subtracted from the latter
to produce the former. An intuitive method for doing this is \trace minimization",
discussed at least as early as Ledermann [1940]. First, note that   is a (sample)
covariance matrix, and is thus positive semi-denite.  ^L should also correspond to
a covariance matrix, and thus should also be positive semi-denite. Consider the
optimization problem
min
 ^D
Tr( ^L)(3)
s.t.  ^L =     ^D;  ^D diagonal;
 ^D  0;  ^L  0
Here Tr() denotes the sum of diagonal entries of a matrix, and  0 indicates positive
semi-deniteness. The intuition for trace minimization is that the \extra" variance
present in the diagonal entries of   has the form of a full rank matrix, and thus in
order to recover a low rank matrix such as  L, as much of this as possible needs to
be removed.17
If N = 200, the the semi-denite program corresponding to (3) involves 200 
199 = 39; 800 constraints: each o-diagonal entry ii0 in the positive semi-denite
matrix   must be equal to the corresponding entry in  ^L. Problems of this size,
however, are feasible using modern semidenite programming algorithms. We thus
compute  ^L using (3), and will use it as the basis for producing an estimate of
16The diagonal entries of   do not in general have a useful form. For example, even in the very
simple case where there is only one group and 1 is uniformly distributed on [0; b], the ith diagonal
entry would be a non-trivial nonlinear expression b
2
12 (
6
b + (i1   4))i1 + `i(1  ). A simpler form
for the diagonal entries could be obtained by using a mixture Poisson approximation, such as the
Poisson-Gamma used in Ashford and Hunt [1973]. A variety of these distributions are discussed in
Karlis and Xekalaki [2005]. None of the options available, however, appear to simplify the diagonal
entries enough to be directly useful from an empirical perspective.
17Saunderson et al. [2012] show that the intuition of Ledermann and others was correct in general.
Specically, the positive semi-denite matrix  L can be recovered given   so long as it is suciently
\incoherent", and this property is satised by most low rank matrices. Details are provided in
Appendix B.
10
insurgent group presence in the next two subsections.
2.3 Non-overlapping Insurgent Groups
We desire both an estimate J^ , the total number of organized insurgent groups, as
well as an estimate ^ij for each district i and group j, giving the number of insurgent
members of the group operating in that district. The set of estimates f^ijg will have a
total of N J^ elements. It turns out to be easiest to rst produce the f^ijg estimates
for each value of J 2 f1; :::; Jmaxg, and then choose a J^ based on examining this set
of estimates.18 We will thus begin by assuming that J is known, and consider how to
compute estimates f^ijg given J . After this, we will then consider how to choose J^ .
An approach based on standard clustering techniques will be presented in this
subsection, as well as one based on eigenvalues. Matrix factorization will be con-
sidered in Section 2.4. The approach based on clustering and that based on matrix
factorization are largely complementary in that they rely on dierent assumptions.
This provides a form of cross-validation for our results, which is important given the
novelty of these methodologies within the eld of political economy.
Estimation via standard clustering techniques requires an additional assumption
dierent from those that will be needed for the techniques of Section 2.4: specically,
it is necessary to assume that the various insurgent groups present do not have over-
lapping territories. That is, there one organized group j present in any given district
i.19 Based on this assumption, reordering the districts i allows  L to be written as a
block-diagonal matrix:
(4)  L =
266664
 1L 0
0  jL
:::
0 :::  JL
377775
where there are a total of J organized groups, and each block  jL has the form given
in Equation 2. To produce estimates f^ijg we will rst determine which organized
18The exact choice of Jmax is not important.
19This is a direct consequence of the standard assumption that factors should be orthogonal,
combined with the fact that insurgent prevalence  must be non-negative.
11
group is present in each district, and then afterwards we will determine the strength
of this group in the district.
To determine which organized group is present in each district, we will follow a
modied k-means type approach20. Begin by constructing a scaled version of  L:
 corL = D(
X
j
jj) 1=2 LD(
X
j
jj) 1=2;
where D() indicates a diagonal matrix with the specied vector on the diagonal. This
process is occasionally referred to as \sphering" and it often improves the quality of
the clustering. By assumption, for each district i, ij = 0 for all but one group j,
and thus  corL is constructed by dividing row i and column i of  L by the value of ij
for the single group j that is present in i.
The "cor" superscript is used because  corL is positive semi-denite with all diagonal
entries equal to one, and thus has the form of a correlation matrix. However, observe
that each o-diagonal entry ii0 has now been divided by iji0j if the same insurgent
group is present in districts i and i0. Thus, in exactly the same way as (4), after
suitable rearrangement  corL is a block diagonal matrix with entries consisting only of
zeros and ones:
(5)  corL =
266664
1N1 0
0 1Nj
:::
0 ::: 1NJ
377775
where 1Nj is an Nj by Nj matrix consisting entirely of ones, and corresponding to the
Nj districts that have group j present in them.
21
Running a k-means type clustering algorithm on  corL would be trivial, but only
the nite sample version is available. Let  ^corL be the correlation matrix associated
with the nite sample covariance matrix  ^L.
22 This  ^corL will have o-diagonal entries
20In many clustering approaches transformations or scaling of the original data is common. An
example is spectral clustering, a methodology we also employed in the working paper version of
the paper. We discuss this approach, and reasons why our current approach may be preferable, in
Appendix C. Luxburg [2007] provides a general discussion of the technique.
21Note that this step relies on the assumption that there is an organized insurgent group present
in every district: if there were a district with no organized presence, creating the correlation matrix
would involve division by zero.
22The correlation matrix  ^corL is readily obtained by imposing diagonal elements equal to 1 and
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that are neither zero nor one. For many k-means algorithms, a distance matrix rather
than a correlation matrix is needed. Such a distance matrix can easily be constructed
using cosine distances: 1  corii0 is the cosine distance between i and i0, where corii0 is
the o-diagonal entry of  corL corresponding to districts i and i
0.23 The cosine distance
between two districts with the same group present will be zero asymptotically, while it
will be one when the districts have dierent groups present. Given J , any reasonable
clustering algorithm should thus be able to recover which insurgent group is present
in which district, given enough data.24
Once districts have been clustered into groups, estimates for fijg can be obtained.
Begin by supposing that each organized group that is present has members in a large
number of districts, and that no single district has a particularly large ij. Let
Ij be the set of districts that have members of organized group j. Then, since an
assumption of the model was that the organized groups do not overlap, an estimate of
ij for i 2 Ij can be produced via the following approximation, using  j, the relevant
block of the original  .25
Specically, note that a sum across the o-diagonal entries of a row of   corre-
sponding to district i is
P
i0 6=i iji0j. If there are a large number of districts with
members of j, then it is reasonable to use the approximationX
i0 6=i
iji0j '
X
i0
iji0j(6)
= ij
X
i0
i0j
= ijaj
appropriately rescaling rows and columns of the covariance matrix  ^L by the square root of the
corresponding diagonal entry of  ^L:
23The construction of a distance matrix is trivial because any correlation matrix is also an inter-
point angle matrix, and these angles can be used directly to construct a cosine distance matrix.
24A weighted clustering approach appears to be called for, because a district with very low ij
for the group j that is present will have very noisy o-diagonal entries. We do not explore optimal
weights, instead using ad-hoc weights corresponding to the square root of the diagonal entries of  ^L.
Krishna and Narasimha [1999] provide a weighted k-means algorithm, based on genetic optimization:
we use the Hornik, Feinerer, Kober, and Buchta [2012] implementation of this algorithm. Using
unweighted clustering instead does not change any of the results discussed below substantially.
25A potential alternative approach to the one presented here would be to use the diagonal entries
of  ^L to produce estimates of fijg. However, this matrix is itself the output of a semi-denite
program based on  . The approach presented below has the advantage of using the o-diagonal
entries of   directly.
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where aj =
P
i0 i0j is the same for any choice of district i within Ij. The row sums
of the o-diagonal entries of each block of  j thus give the relative prevalence of
organized group members in each district in Ij.
26
We now consider how to produce an estimate J^ of the number of insurgent groups
present. Our approach is based on a modication of the \gap statistic" of Tibshirani,
Walther, and Hastie [2001].27 The intuition behind this technique is that adding
an additional cluster increases the number of degrees of freedom in the model, and
thus an appropriate estimate J^ must somehow counterbalance this in order to avoid
overtting the data. This is done by comparing the performance of the model with
the actual data to a case with randomly generated data that is known not to have any
group structure. In general, computational diculties loom large in the clustering
literature and asymptotic behaviour is given only limited consideration. Below, we
present a simple computationally feasible estimator for J^ . In Appendix D we discuss
modications that would be necessary for the consistency of this estimator.
In general, the gap statistic approach makes use of the value
(7) Gap(k) = E[log(Wk)]  log(Wk):
Here Wk is some measure of variation left unexplained by the k clusters, and E
 is
the expectation taken with respect to a \reference distribution" chosen to correspond
to no cluster structure. In Equation 7, Gap(k) quanties an intuitive denition of the
quality of a k group clustering of the observed data: the clustering is \good" only to
the extent that it is better than what would occur with randomly generated data that
had no group structure by construction. Following Tibshirani, Walther, and Hastie
[2001], the estimated number of clusters J^ is then selected to be the smallest k such
26While it would be possible to use non-linear programming or other techniques to develop an
estimator with more desirable properties, the approximate estimator has at least two advantages.
First, the estimator has an intuitive interpretation:   is a covariance matrix, and the sum across the
o-diagonal entries of a row of   thus gives an indication (in a heuristic sense) of how closely linked
attacks in a given district are with attacks in other districts. Second, if in the data a given district i
experiences only a small number of attacks, then the o-diagonal entries ii0 will be relatively small
for that district, and thus i will not introduce substantial noise into estimates ^i0j for other districts
i0. Developing an unbiased estimator that also possesses such properties appears to be a non-trivial
undertaking.
27An alternative approach would be to compare  ^corL to the correlation matrix that would be
predicted from the k means results, and choose the number of groups that minimized the distance
between these two matrices. We do not pursue this approach because it is not clear what sort of
distance function might be appropriate.
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that
(8) Gap(k)  Gap(k + 1)  sk+1;
where sk+1 is an estimated standard error of log(Wk) in the case where there is no
cluster structure. Gap(k) describes how much better the estimated cluster structure
of k groups looks, compared to how it would be expected to look if there were in
reality no cluster structure. If Gap(k)  Gap(k + 1), then this means that adding
the k + 1th cluster did not improve the clustering any more than would be expected
with random unclustered data.
In the standard Tibshirani, Walther, and Hastie [2001] setup, if clustering were
performed using  cor, Wk would be the residual sum of squares or \within sum of
squares": the variation in  cor that is not explained by the group structure. How-
ever, this standard approach runs into problems with the calculation of E[log(Wk)]
because a reference distribution for  ^corL needs to be calculated.
28 This calculation ap-
pears to be extremely complicated, because the answer depends on the nite sample
behavior of  ^corL , which is not well understood. We avoid this problem by modifying
the standard Tibshirani, Walther, and Hastie [2001] approach, and use a Wk dened
with respect to a set of auxiliary covariates Z, rather than  cor.29
To see why this simplies the problem, note that in the model the only source
of correlation in insurgent attacks across districts is through . In particular, our
model assumes that if the same insurgent group is present in both districts i and
i0, the correlation in attacks between districts will not depend on the relationship
between any other covariates of i and i0: for example, it does not matter whether i is
geographically close to i0, or geographically distant. We will now add one additional
assumption. Suppose that the districts where a given insurgent group is present
are less dispersed in terms of these auxiliary covariates Z than a set of randomly
chosen districts. For simplicity, we will focus specically on geography, that is Zi =
(lati; longi), but our approach is potentially more general.
Let WJ describe the geographic dispersion of the insurgent group territories when
28Specically, we would need to know how much adding a J + 1th group should improve model
t, if there are only actually J groups in the data.
29We employed the standard Tibshirani, Walther, and Hastie approach described here in a previous
version of this paper. The results for Afghanistan were identical as those presented below. However,
the results for Pakistan were not as easy to interpret. All results are available on request.
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there are J groups, according to the following formula:
(9) WJ =
JX
j=1
1
2Nj
X
i;i02Ij
d2i;i0
where di;i0 is the geographic (Haversine) distance between districts i and i
0. As before,
Ij is the set of districts where insurgent group J is present, and Nj is the cardinality of
this set. WJ follows the \within sum of squares" formula from the analysis of variance
literature. The intuition here is that, at numbers of groups beyond the true number
of groups J , the additional groups will be based on nite sample noise, which is by
assumption uncorrelated with geography. Thus, the additional groups should not
be correlated with geography, and thus values of WJ should not decrease any faster
than would be expected in the case where groups were randomly assigned.30 The
\random assignment" case, needed for determining E[log(Wk)], can be generated
via Monte Carlo permutations of the group structure: randomly reassign geographic
coordinates to each of the districts, thereby forcing group membership to be unrelated
to geographic location.
One does not have to exclusively rely on the gap statistic to estimate the number
of groups J . In fact, this parameter is also recoverable using an entirely dierent
approach, one based on the spectral properties of  L. Notice that each  
j
L in (4)
has rank 1, implying the rank of  L is J .
31 The rank of  L can be then consistently
estimated by applying the intuition of Ahn and Horenstein [2013], using the eigenval-
ues of  L. Ahn and Horenstein's \eigenratio" approach proceeds as follows. Suppose
that we were interested in estimating the rank of  L. Let ^k be the k th largest
eigenvalue of  ^L. Asymptotically, the rst J of these eigenvalues will be positive
and bounded away from zero, while the remaining N   J will go to zero. Ahn and
Horenstein consider the \eigenratio"
(10) ERk = ^k=^k+1:
Asymptotically, ERk will converge to some positive value ck for k < J . However, it
30There may still be a decrease, but it should not be rapid. Eventually W must fall, because
WN = 0, with each group containing only one district.
31This is because the vectors j and j0 describing insurgent group presence are orthogonal for
j 6= j0.
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will diverge to innity for k = J , as the denominator becomes increasingly close to
zero while the numerator remains bounded away from zero. A simple estimate for J^
can then be obtained by choosing the J^ that gives the highest value for ERJ^ .
32
To summarize, in this subsection the specic estimator used is the following. We
begin with  ^L, which approximates a low rank block-diagonal matrix where each
block corresponds to the districts where a given organized group is present.  ^L is
then normalized to obtain the correlation matrix  ^corL , which provides cosine distances
that are used for k-means clustering, which determines which group is present in each
district. The number of groups to use in this clustering is determined by the gain in
t (dened as log within sum of squares based on a set of covariates Z) associated
with various choices for the number of groups, or alternatively by eigenratio methods.
2.4 Potentially Overlapping Insurgent Groups
We now relax the assumption that insurgent groups do not overlap. As in the
approach discussed above, we will begin by assuming that J is known, and estimate
fijg. We then produce an estimate J^ based on a comparison of these estimates for
dierent values of J . The estimates for fijg will be based on non-negative matrix
factorization, and the J^ estimate will be based on a modication of the eigenratio
approach discussed above.
We rst construct an estimator for the fijg, given an assumed number of groups
J . Consider choosing ^ij for each district i and group j to satisfy, to the extent
possible, the set of restrictions
^ii0 =
X
j
^ij^i0j:
where ^ii0 is the relevant entry in  ^L, estimated in (3), above. If there are N districts,
there are N(N + 1)=2 restrictions: one for each o-diagonal element in one half of
the symmetric covariance matrix, plus the diagonal elements. If there are J groups,
there are N  J parameters to be estimated: one ^ij for each district i and group j.
A necessary condition for identication is thus that (N + 1)=2  J .
In the data used the number of districts is large relative to plausible numbers of
32Ahn and Horenstein [2013] require that there be some exogenous maximum number of possible
factors, Jmax. We follow this, and use Jmax = 80 for this paper. Simulations provided in Appendix
E show why this Jmax is necessary.
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groups, and thus this inequality holds strictly and a penalty function is required. An
obvious estimator for fijg would then be the squared Frobenius norm
(11) argmin
^ij0
X
i
X
i0
 
^ii0  
X
j
^ij^i0j
!2
:
Unfortunately, solving this optimization problem directly by searching the space of
fijg is challenging because the problem as stated is non-convex in fijg. A variety of
algorithms have been proposed for solving this problem. We will use the \Procrustes
rotation" algorithm of Huang, Sidiropoulos, and Swami [2014]. This algorithm does
not attempt to minimize (11), but instead solves a related optimization problem
based on a spectral decomposition of  ^L. Huang and Sidiropoulos [2014] show that
this algorithm is eective at solving (11), despite the fact that this objective is not
used as part of the algorithm.33
We now consider how to produce an estimate J^ . In Section 2.3, the rank of  L
was J , because the vectors j and j0 describing insurgent group presence would be
orthogonal for j 6= j0. This is no longer true if groups have the potential to overlap.
Instead of the rank of  L, we thus base our estimate J^ on the completely positive rank
of  L: that is, the rank of A, where  L = AA
T, and all entries of A are non-negative.
Without further assumptions this decomposition is not identied: for example,
(12)  L =
"
1 1
1 1
#
could be decomposed either into
(13) A =
"
1
1
#
or
(14) A =
"
1p
2
1p
2
1p
2
1p
2
#
:
33A previous version of this paper optimized (11) directly, using the algorithm of Birgin, Martinez,
and Raydan [2000]. The (qualitatively identical) results from this direct approach are available upon
request. Huang, Sidiropoulos, and Swami [2014] is orders of magnitude faster, converging in seconds
or minutes rather than hours or days.
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Huang and Sidiropoulos [2014] summarize assumptions under which the non-negative
factorization of  L becomes unique for practical purposes:
34 each factor must have
at least J   1 non-zero entries, and the non-zero entries of one factor must not be a
subset of the non-zero entries of any other factor. In the example above, the second
assumption is violated by (14). We will assume that the Huang and Sidiropoulos
[2014] assumptions are satised. Thus, faced with the covariance matrix in (12), we
would conclude that J^ = 1 based on the factorization in (13).
If  L were known, the number of organized groups could thus be calculated im-
mediately by producing a non-negative factorization of  L. However, only the nite
sample  ^L is actually available, and in general this matrix will not have a non-negative
factorization due to nite sample variation.
To address this problem, we will use a modication of the \eigenratio" approach.
In fact, the intuition behind the Ahn and Horenstein [2013] approach appears very
general. Consider a rank k approximation to anNN matrix. The rst k eigenvectors
can be used to create such an approximation. How much better is a rank k + 1
approximation? If the k+1th eigenvalue is very small relative to the kth eigenvalue,
then considering a rank k + 1 matrix instead of a rank k matrix does not improve
the approximation very much, and ERk will thus be very high. We can apply this
general intuition to the case of the group structure of  ^L. Let Ak be an approximate
non-negative factorization of  ^L with k factors. How much better would Ak+1 be
as an approximation to  ^L? Asymptotically, if  L was produced by k groups, the
improvement will be zero.
A ratio equivalent to Ahn and Horenstein's \eigenratio" can then be expressed as
(15) NNRk =
jj ^L   AkATk jj2F   jj ^L   Ak 1ATk 1jj2F
jj ^L   Ak+1ATk+1jj2F   jj ^L   AkATk jj2F
where jjjjF is the Frobenius norm. The intuition for NNRk is exactly that of the
eigenratio approach: if  L has a completely positive rank of k, then the k+1th factor
should not help explain  L, and thus NNRk should diverge to innity. In contrast,
values of NNRk for k < J will converge to nite values.
35
The ER estimator has a nite sample tendency to estimate J^ = 1, because the
34Conditions theoretically guaranteeing the uniqueness of the factorization are more complicated:
see the references in Huang and Sidiropoulos [2014].
35Ding, He, and Simon [2005] describe from a more general perspective the similarities between
NNMF and spectral clustering.
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eigenvalues of random matrices are generally distributed so that the rst few eigen-
values are spaced further apart than most of the remaining eigenvalues.36 This eect
has been noted previously by Ferson and Kim [2012], and Guo-Fitoussi and Darne
[2014] perform an extensive simulation-based analysis.37
The attack datasets that we consider in this paper, however, are noisier than the
data generally used by researchers studying factor models in macro or nance. We are
thus particulary interested in the nite sample properties of the estimator when the
signal-to-noise ratio is very low. In Appendix E, we provide gures illustrating the
behaviour of the eigenratio estimator as the signal vanishes. The simulations that we
perform are eectively identical to those conducted in Guo-Fitoussi and Darne [2014],
as well as the original monte carlo exercises of Ahn and Horenstein [2013]. To the best
of our knowledge, however, the gures that we produce have not previously appeared
in the literature: this includes Appendix Figure E.3d, showing the distribution of the
eigenratio estimator under the null hypothesis that there is no group structure.
The nite sample behaviour of the eigenratio estimator is shared by estimators
using NNR. It will thus be important to check whether the values of NNR obtained
might have arisen by random chance from data with no actual group structure. Con-
sider the value of maxk<Jmax NNRk. We wish to compare this test statistic to its
distribution under the assumption that there is no actual group structure, obtaining
appropriate p-values.38
To do so, consider a \reference distribution" where there are no organized groups.
Randomly generate attack data based on this distribution, calculate an equivalent to
 ^L based on this randomly generated data, calculate a value for NNRk based on this
matrix, and then repeat this process 100 times. We consider three dierent reference
distributions: specics are provided in Appendix F.
36Classic references here include the Wigner [1955] semi-circular distribution and the Marchenko-
Pastur [1967] distribution.
37As Mirza and Storjohann [2014] point out, the eect is visible in the original Ahn and Horenstein
[2013] simulations.
38Other hypothesis tests are dicult to perform: the distribution of eigenvalues resulting from
random variation in nite samples is not obvious. We thus do not report condence intervals for J^ .
For similar reasons, we also do not report condence intervals for f^ijg below.
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2.5 Robustness: potentially changing district environments
Both the non-overlapping and overlapping approaches just described assume that
the covariance in attacks by group members across districts remains the same even
across long periods of time. In the observed data, however, it could be the case that
in earlier years certain districts are the focus of many attacks, while in later years
activity shifts to other districts. These sorts of long term changes can be accounted
for by considering only the covariance in attacks across districts within shorter time
windows.
Let  m be calculated the same as   from Equation 2, but using only daily attack
data from month m. As the number of days of data used to calculate  m does not
increase asymptotically for any given month m, estimation based on a single  m
would be inconsistent. Aggregating across months, however, results in a consistent
estimator that is robust to changes in attack probabilities between districts at monthly
frequency.
Specically, assume that the probability of an attack in district i in month m, ei-
ther from unorganized militants or an organized group, now changes with a parameter
im. That is, the probability of an attack from a unorganized militant is now im,
and the probability of an attack from member of organized group j is now imjt.
Let D() indicate a diagonal matrix with the given entries on the diagonal. If  were
known, the standardized matrix ~ m = D(
1
m
) mD(
1
m
) could be summed to create
~  = D(
P
m m)
~ mD(
P
m m).
~  could then be used to estimate fijg. In reality, 
is unobserved; however, dividing by the observed number of attacks creates a feasible
estimator, with  identied up to scale. This approach can be employed with both
estimation based on clustering and that based on non-negative matrix factorization.
Further details are provided in Appendix G.
3 Data
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan were covered by the Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, a discontinued U.S. government database [Wigle 2010].39 Data is available
for location, date, and type of violent incidents from the beginning of 2003 to the end
39The data remains accessible online courtesy of the Empirical Studies Of Conict (ESOC) project
at Princeton University.
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Figure 1: Afghanistan data
(a) Total attacks per capita (b) Ethnic Groups
of 2009.40
The violent incidents cataloged in the WITS data are episodes of violence initi-
ated by insurgents, or acts of random violence. The data does not include violence
directly connected to military counterinsurgency operations, such as for instance a
U.S. military attack on a Taliban safe house or the bombing of a fortied compound.
The location reported for an attack in WITS is given as latitude and longitude
coordinates. This would seem to suggest that attacks could be analyzed as some
sort of spatial point process. Closer inspection, however, reveals that the latitude
and longitude coordinates reported are not those of the actual location of the attack,
but rather the coordinates of a prominent nearby geographic feature. Sometimes this
is a city or village, but for the vast majority of incidents the location given is that
of the centroid of the district in which the incident occurred. In Afghanistan, the
\district" is the lowest-level political unit and the unit of geographic location in our
model. We also note that a few districts have been split in recent years: this paper
uses 2005 administrative boundaries, which specify 398 districts. The WITS data
eectively provides panel data at the district-day level, with N = 398 and T = 2082.
District-level geographic locations are also used for the Pakistan WITS data.
40The following two examples illustrate the typical form of incident descriptions:
\On 27 March 2005, in Laghman, Afghanistan, assailants red rockets at the Governor House,
killing four Afghan soldiers and causing minor damage. The Taliban claimed responsibility for
the attack." And \On 19 February 2006, in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber detonated
an improvised explosive device (IED) prematurely near a road used by government and military
personnel, causing no injuries or damage. No group claimed responsibility."
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Figure 2: Pakistan data
(a) Total attacks per capita (b) Ethnic Groups
According to the data, there are some days where as many as 64 dierent districts
in Afghanistan are aected by simultaneous insurgent attacks. However, there are
also 123 districts with no reported incidents over the entire 2004-2009 time period. It
is apparent to even the most casual observer that attacks are concentrated in certain
areas of the country.
For Pakistan, the BFRS dataset [Mesquita et al. 2015] is also available. This
is similar to WITS, in that it provides daily data on violent incidents, including
geographic information. BFRS data is available until 2011, and over the WITS time
frame of 2004-2009, BFRS contains approximately twice as many incidents as WITS.
Because of the greater number of attacks recorded, we prefer the BFRS data to
the WITS data, We make use only of BFRS data from mid-2008 onwards, because
qualitative evidence suggests that the structure of insurgent groups during this 3.5
year period was relatively stable.
Additional geographic information available for Afghanistan includes the location
of roads, rivers, and settlements.41 We aggregate this data to the district level in
order to use it jointly with the district-level attack data. For geographic data on
ethnicities, we use the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira data.42
In Figure 1 we show the pattern of attacks by district in Afghanistan and the
distribution of ethnicities. The concentration of attacks in the ethnic Pashtun areas
41This data was also obtained from ESOC.
42The version used is the \Geo-referencing of ethnic groups" (GREG) data set of Weidmann et
al. [2010].
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Figure 3: Afghanistan groups via spherical k-means
(a) 2 Groups (b) 3 Groups
is evident. In Figure 2 we report the same information for Pakistan. This data forms
the basis for most of the analysis that will be performed in the following section.
We will also perform some additional follow-up analysis regarding Afghanistan.
To provide context for this, and help the reader in interpreting maps, we provide
additional maps and tables in Appendix A.
Appendix Figure A.1 shows the main Afghan highways. Even without formal
analysis, it is clear that the data conrm two well known qualitative features regarding
insurgent attacks in Afghanistan: they are more likely to occur in Pashtun areas, and
there is a particular concentration on the ring road highway running south from the
capital, Kabul.
Appendix Table A.1 provides a summary of the US Afghan counterinsurgency
timeline produced by the Council of Foreign Relations. Evidence of the deterioration
of the security environment in Afghanistan is reported in Appendix Figure A.2, which
shows the distribution of incidents by district for the 2004-2007 and 2008-2009 periods,
in per capita terms.
4 Results
We will rst analyze the attack data from Afghanistan, and then consider the
case of Pakistan. In both cases, we begin with the spherical k-means clustering and
\gap statistic" approach outlined Section 2.3, and then proceed to the non-negative
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Figure 4: Eigenratios, Afghanistan
(Sorted) Eigenvalue Number
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matrix factorization approach of Section 2.4. For all these analyses, we will use attack
covariance matrices calculated using only within-month variation, as described in
Section 2.5, unless specically noted otherwise. This is because it is important to
avoid contamination by long-term trends in the conict, as well as seasonal variation.
We end this section by further examining the Afghanistan attack data, looking for
changes between the earlier part of the 2004-2009 period and the latter.
4.1 Afghanistan
We begin by analyzing the attack data from Afghanistan. Figure 3 shows clus-
tering based on spherical k-means, as outlined in Section 2.3.43 Qualitatively, the
clusters shown in the gure here appear indistinguishable from random noise. We
test this using the gap statistic presented in Equation 7. Column I of Table 1 shows
the results of this analysis for Afghanistan. We will use this column to provide some
further detailed exposition of this approach.
Under the hypothesis of one organized groups of insurgents, the model is with-
out degrees of freedom (all districts must be associated with that group) and hence
the geographic variation left unexplained in both the actual data and the permuted
43These gures are calculated based on a \within month" covariance matrix, as described in
Section 2.5. Results do not change with other approaches.
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Table 1: Gap Statistic
Afghanistan Pakistan
I II
1 group Randomly shued data (mean) 16.765 16.929
Actual data - 16.765 16.929
Gap A 0.000 0.000
2 groups Randomly shued data (mean) 16.760 16.921
Actual data - 16.765 16.897
Gap B -0.005 0.024
Gap statistic (B minus A) -0.005 0.024
Randomly shued data (std. dev.) 0.006 0.011
3 groups Randomly shued data (mean) 16.755 16.912
Actual data - 16.757 16.736
Gap C -0.002 0.176
Gap statistic (C minus B) 0.003 0.152
Randomly shued data (std. dev.) 0.008 0.015
4 groups Randomly shued data (mean) 16.749 16.903
Actual data - 16.755 16.622
Gap D -0.005 0.281
Gap statistic (D minus C) -0.004 0.105
Randomly shued data (std. dev.) 0.011 0.019
5 groups Randomly shued data (mean) 16.745 16.894
Actual data - 16.738 16.758
Gap E 0.007 0.136
Gap statistic (E minus D) 0.012 -0.145
Randomly shued data (std. dev.) 0.011 0.021
Each column computes the gap statistic as described in Section 2.3, based on a within-
month covariance matrix as described in Section 2.5. Columns dier in the underlying
attack data used:
Column I uses the full Afghanistan WITS dataset.
Column II uses the Pakistan BFRS dataset for May 2008 - October 2011.
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(reference distribution) data is the same (all of it), leaving Gap(0) = 0 in the third
row (marked \A"). Allowing for two groups of insurgents in the data leads to free
parameters (which districts are associated with each group). However, it turns out
that there is actually slightly less geographic variation left unexplained in the ran-
domly permuted data compared to the actual data (16.760 vs. 16.765). This produces
Gap(2) =  0:005 (marked \B"). The gap statistic (B-A) is thus  0:005, which, since
it is negative, is denitely lower than 0:006, the estimated standard deviation for
unexplained geographic variation in the case where districts are randomly assigned
to insurgent groups. Thus, J^ = 1 satises Inequality 8, and we conclude that there
is only one insurgent group present in Afghanistan. The eigenratio approach of Ahn
and Horenstein [2013] produces an identical result, as illustrated in Figure 4.
The group membership shown in Figure 3 involves a discrete partition of districts
into insurgent groups. Some districts, however, might have many insurgents, while
other districts might have few. Furthermore, there might be districts where more
than one insurgent group is active. The model presented in Section 2.4 allows for
these possibilities. An additional advantage of this model is that it provides a test
against that null hypothesis that J = 0, and all attacks are the result of disorganized
local actors. In contrast, the model used in Section 2.3 assumes that there is exactly
one organized group present in each district, and thus this model cannot be used to
test the hypothesis that there are actually no groups.
We thus move on to the alternate model of Section 2.4. A non-negative factor-
ization of the attack covariance matrix, following Equation 11, turns out to give very
similar results to those just discussed above. In contrast to the previous approach,
multiple insurgent groups may now be active in any single district, and thus it is no
longer possible to easily display the estimated insurgent group structure on a single
map. Instead, we produce one map for each group. Figure 5 provides a visualization
of this factorization in the case where J = 2. Again, there is no discernible pattern
to the estimated insurgent groups.
We are particularly interested, however, in whether we can reject the null hypoth-
esis that J = 0, and there are no organized insurgent groups present at all. We begin
by calculating the ratio described in Equation 15, and choose J^ so as to maximize
this ratio. We then consider the distribution that this ratio would have if there were
actually no organized groups. To do this, we use the permutation approach described
in Section 2.4 and Appendix F.
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Figure 5: Afghanistan, 2 groups via NNMF
(a) Group 1 (b) Group 2
Table 2: Estimated number of groups via NNR, Afghanistan
Not by Month By Month
I II III IV V
Afghanistan (WITS, Jan 2004 - Sept 2009, weighted) 4 4 1 1 1
(p value, vs. no group structure) 0.57 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.03
Afghanistan (WITS, Jan 2004 - Sept 2009, unweighted) 1 1 1 1 1
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06
Each row presents two estimates of J^ , the number of groups present. Columns I and
II show the rst estimate, described in Section 2.4. Columns III through V show
the second estimate, based on the within-month covariance matrix as described in
Section 2.5.
In each column, the p values presented are a test of the null hypothesis that there is
no group structure. Other tests (e.g. J = 1 vs. J = 2) appear dicult to construct.
Columns I and III compute p values by comparing to a reference distribution where
the time of the attacks within each district has been permuted. See Appendix F for
a description of this and other reference distributions.
Column IV is the same as Column III, but the time of attacks is permuted only within
each month.
Columns II and V consider only permutations that keep constant the total number
of attacks in each district and on each day.
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Table 2 shows the results of this analysis for the Afghanistan data. There are four
estimates of J provided. Beginning with the rst two columns of the rst row, J^ = 4
in the case where districts are weighted proportional to the number of attacks in the
district. Continuing to the next three columns of the rst row, J^ = 1 if, in addition
to this weighting, the covariance matrix is calculated considering only within-month
variation in attacks using the approach described in Section 2.5. The second row
provides estimates without weighting districts, and results in J^ = 1 regardless of
whether the approach in Section 2.5 is used or not.
Below each J^ estimate a p value is shown, corresponding to a test of the null
hypothesis that in fact there is no group structure, with J = 0. We see that in
general the null is rejected at the 95% level. The exception is the case where our
estimate was J^ = 4: with this specication, the model appears to have low power.
This analysis supports the results obtained in Table 1, in that there appears to be one
organized group of insurgents, rather than more than one. Furthermore, the observed
NNR1 values, calculated according to Equation 15, appear to be more extreme than
would be the case if there were no organized groups at all. Table 2 shows that the
observed data appears to be inconsistent with J = 0, a conclusion that we were not
above to draw from the gap statistic results shown in Table 1.
4.2 Pakistan
We now consider the Pakistan attack data. We are particularly interested in the
period from mid-2008 until the fall of 2011, as this was a period when the structure
of terrorist groups was relatively stable. We begin by clustering Pakistani districts
into groups for each J 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. Our assumption is that a clustering that is
due to random noise will not have any particular structure in terms of covariates Z,
whereas a cluster that represents an actual insurgent group will feature districts that
are more similar in terms of covariates.
Clusterings based on the Pakistan attack data are shown in Figure 6. Unlike the
results for Afghanistan shown in Figure 3, our clusterings for Pakistan, computed on
the basis of the attack covariance matrix, result in groups that appear to be clustered
geographically. For a more formal analysis, we consider the gap statistic results in
Table 1.
Column II of Table 1 reports results for Pakistan for the period of interest. Unlike
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Figure 6: Pakistan groups via spherical k-means
(a) 2 Groups (b) 3 Groups
(c) 4 Groups (d) 5 Groups
the case with Afghanistan in Column I, a comparison of J = 1 with J = 2 shows that a
clustering with two groups based on the attack covariance matrix is substantially more
clustered geographically (with a log within sum of squares of 16.897) than would be
expected by random chance (an average log within sum of squares of 16.921). This
dierence (0.024) is large relative to the standard deviation of clustering based on
random noise (0.011), and thus Inequality 8 is not satised for J = 1.
We thus continue down the rows of Table 1, and proceed to consider the possibility
of three organized groups of insurgents. Here again, a clustering based on the actual
attack covariance matrix is more geographically clustered than one would expect by
random chance. This produces Gap(3) = 0:176 (marked \C"). The gap statistic (C-
B) is thus 0:152, which is again higher than 0:015, the estimated standard deviation
for log(W3). The same situation arises with four groups (where 0:105 > 0:019). In
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Figure 7: Pakistan, 4 groups via NNMF (left column) and ethnicities (right column)
(a) Group 1 (b) Balochis
(c) Group 2 (d) Sindhis
(e) Group 3 (f) Afghans
(g) Group 4 (h) Panjabis, Jhats, Awans
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Table 3: Ethnic composition of groups shown in Figure 6c
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Baloch 0:62 0:25 0:00 0:12
(0:09) (0:09) (0:10) (0:10)
Sindhs 0:04 0:87 0:04 0:04
(0:07) (0:07) (0:08) (0:09)
Afghans 0:12 0:08 0:58 0:23
(0:07) (0:07) (0:08) (0:08)
Panjabis, Jhats, Awans 0:16 0:12 0:23 0:49
(0:05) (0:05) (0:06) (0:06)
Other 0:00 0:29 0:57 0:14
(0:13) (0:13) (0:15) (0:16)
N 115 115 115 115
Each column corresponds to a single regression without intercept.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a given district was
clustered into the specied group number in the clustering shown in Figure 6c. Dis-
tricts shown as white in the gure (\no data") are dropped: the remaining 115
districts are used in the regression.
The independent variables are a set of dummy variables, indicating whether the spec-
ied ethnicity was listed as the rst ethnicity at the centroid of a given district.
Each row should sum to 1 because each coecient in the table is a conditional mean
giving the fraction of districts of the specied ethnicity that were clustered into the
specied group, and the clustering in Figure 6c assigns each district to one group.
Rows may not sum exactly to 1 because of rounding.
Standard errors in parentheses.
contrast, adding a fth group results in a clustering that is not as geographically
clustered as when there were only four groups. We thus conclude that J = 4 in the
case of Pakistan, at least in the 2008-2011 period. The unied insurgent structure
(J = 1) that we recover for the Afghan case thus appears not to be present in Pakistan.
This accords with the qualitative analysis in Dorronsoro [2009].
We now analyze the Pakistan data using the non-negative matrix factorization
approach of Section 2.4. As with the Afghan data, we obtain a result generally in
line with that obtained using the gap statistic approach just discussed. The left-hand
column of Figure 7 shows a non-negative matrix factorization of the attack covariance
matrix for Pakistan, using four factors. The result here is very close to that shown
in Figure 6c. Furthermore, both of these gures show what appears to be a close
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relationship between the estimated group structure and the arrangement of ethnic
groups in Pakistan. The relevant breakdown of these ethnic groups is shown in the
right-hand column of Figure 7.
A qualitative comparison of the left and right columns of Figure 7 shows that
there is one insurgent group present in Balochistan, another in the area populated by
Sindhs, a third in the area populated by \Afghans" (i.e. Pashtuns), and a fourth in
the Punjabi areas of Pakistan. The northernmost areas of Pakistan, with numerous
smaller ethnicities, appear to be associated most closely with the \Afghans".44 The
major ethnic divisions of Pakistan can thus be reproduced successfully using only the
covariance matrix of data on insurgent attacks.
Tables 3 and 4 show the relationship between estimated insurgent groups and
ethnic groups in a quantitative fashion. These tables are constructed to show the
distribution of ethnicities across the estimated groups: each row corresponds to an
ethnicity, and each row sums to 100% (plus or minus rounding error). The rows have
been ordered so that the diagonal entries correspond to the qualitative relationship
between groups and ethnicities just discussed; this is the same ordering of rows that
is used in Figure 7.
We now consider an \eigenratio" type analysis of the Pakistan attack data. In
the case of the Afghanistan data, analysis based on the gap statistic approach with
Table 1 resulted in an estimate of J^ = 1, but it was then necessary to use the results
shown in Table 2 to show that the null hypothesis of J = 0 could be rejected. In
contrast, with the Pakistan data, Table 1 gives J^ = 4. This result would be extreme
under a null hypothesis of J = 0, and thus it is not as important to seek alternate
conrmation that there is indeed a group structure in the data.45 This turns out
to be fortunate, as the \eigenratio" type analysis shown in Table 5 is inconclusive
in the case of the Pakistan data.46 Very few entries are statistically signicant at
44Adding a fth group does not result in these \other" ethnicities being clustered into their own
separate group: see Figure 6d. This may be because these areas consist of many small ethnic groups,
and there is not a sucient number of attacks for these smaller groups to be estimated correctly.
45In order for Table 1 to lead to an estimate of J^ = 4 it must be that for each of two groups,
three groups, and four groups, the improvement in geographic clustering is at least one standard
deviation better than would be expected if there were no group structure. A result of J^ = 4 is thus
already very extreme under the null that J = 0.
46We join a number of other researchers in discarding a low J^ estimate based on eigenratios in
favour of other evidence: both Henzel and Rengel [2014] and Alquist and Coibion [2014] discard
J^ = 1 in favour of two factors, and Bleany et al. [2012] discards J^ = 1 or J^ = 3 in favour of four or
more factors, while Rezitis [2015] discards J^ = 2 in favour of ve factors.
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Table 4: Ethnic composition of groups shown in Figure 7
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Baloch 0:58 0:07 0:12 0:23
(0:05) (0:04) (0:06) (0:06)
Sindhs 0:14 0:35 0:19 0:32
(0:04) (0:03) (0:05) (0:05)
Afghans 0:15 0:07 0:48 0:30
(0:04) (0:03) (0:04) (0:05)
Panjabis, Jhats, Awans 0:22 0:11 0:23 0:44
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:04)
Other 0:05 0:11 0:61 0:24
(0:07) (0:06) (0:08) (0:09)
N 115 115 115 115
Each column corresponds to a single regression without intercept, concerning group
j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g.
The dependent variable is ^ij=
P
j02f1;2;3;4g ^ij0 . This is the fraction of organized
insurgents present in a district that are from group j. This data is displayed in
the left column of Figure 7, and it is available for the same 115 districts that were
analyzed in Table 3.
The independent variables are a set of dummy variables, indicating whether the spec-
ied ethnicity was listed as the rst ethnicity at the centroid of a given district.
Each row should sum to 1 (up to rounding) by the same argument as in Table 3:
each coecient in the table is a conditional mean for the ethnicity in question, every
district is coded as one ethnicity, and the group shares must sum to one.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Estimated number of groups via NNR, Pakistan
Not by Month By Month
I II III IV V
Pakistan (BFRS, May 2008 - Oct 2011, weighted) 1 1 1 1 1
0.63 0.63 0.16 0.28 0.55
Pakistan (BFRS, May 2008 - Oct 2011, unweighted) 2 2 16 16 16
0.73 0.68 0.00 0.01 0.03
Notes: same as Table 2, except with Pakistan data.
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the 95% level, and those that are appear to be computational artifacts of some sort,
giving very high estimates for J^ . We conrm this by rerunning the analysis using the
original eigenratio from Equation 10.47
4.3 Further Analysis: Afghanistan
Based on Tables 1 and 2, we have estimated J^ = 1 for Afghanistan. It is thus not
relevant to compute factorizations such as those shown in Figure 7 for Pakistan, be-
cause we believe that there is only group. Instead, we will rst consider our estimates
for how this organized insurgent group is distributed across Afghanistan. We will then
extend our analysis by considering potential changes to the prevalence of the members
of this organized insurgent group across time. We will use a number of covariates as
part of this analysis: Table 6 includes summary statistics for total incidents, ethnic
fragmentation, roads, rivers, and settlements by district for Afghanistan.
The approximation in Equation 6 can be used to reveal the latent geographic
distribution of the Taliban and, with this, we can investigate the geographic spread
of the insurgency. Table 7 shows regression results based on this approximation
including a set of ethnic and geographic controls, as well as province xed eects.
The dependent variable used in these regressions is displayed in Appendix Figure
A.3.48
The coecient estimates reported in Table 7 should be read as correlates of Taliban
presence in each district. Most of these results are not surprising. Ethnicities other
than Pashtun (the omitted ethnicity) are substantially less likely to be associated
with organized group activity.49 These include the Hazara, a Shia group hostile to
the (Sunni) Taliban, as well as the Tajik and Uzbek communities. These latter groups
47This is theoretically less appealing, because it is associated with eigenvectors that could imply a
negative presence of insurgent groups in certain districts. However, it is numerically less challenging
to compute. Most of these results are statistically insignicant, and are available upon request.
48Appendix Figure A.4 shows the estimated prevalence of the single group of organized insurgents
under the non-negative matrix factorization approach. A disadvantage of the estimation strategies
used in this paper is that they only provide information about the relative prevalence of each
organized group across districts. The units reported in Appendix Figure A.3 thus do not have an
interpretation in levels: 0 corresponds to no attacks being attributable to organized group members,
but the numeric scale of the legend is arbitrary, and it is not possible to interpret the results
in terms of \fraction of attacks due to organized groups" without additional assumptions. The
numbers reported in the legend are the number of attacks per million people the organized group
would have been responsible for if 2 = 1, but this choice is arbitrary.
49Ethnic variables are based on share of settlements in districts covered by GREG ethnic bound-
aries.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
PASHTUN 396 0:516 0:439 0:000 1:000
UZBEK 396 0:123 0:285 0:000 1:000
BALOCH 396 0:015 0:099 0:000 1:000
HAZARA 396 0:097 0:257 0:000 1:000
TAJIK 396 0:219 0:357 0:000 1:000
PAMIR.TAJIK 396 0:013 0:094 0:000 1:000
ORMURI 396 0:005 0:050 0:000 0:731
NURISTANI 396 0:012 0:084 0:000 0:846
POPULATION 398 58:673 150:129 1:841 2; 882:164
AREA 398 1:948 2:624 0:032 25:128
LIGHT 398 0:051 0:192 0:000 2:000
LATITUDE 398 34:580 1:724 29:889 38:225
LONGITUDE 398 67:796 2:607 61:156 73:349
ROADS 398 1:063 1:212 0 6
RIVERS 398 0:798 1:687 0:000 13:598
The rst eight variables indicate the shares of ethnicities in each district. PASHTUN also includes
Pashai, Tirahi, Afghan Arabs, and Persians. UZBEK also includes Turkmens and Kirghis.
BALOCH also includes Brahui. HAZARA includes Mongols, in addition to Hazaraberberi and
Hazaradehizainat. TAJIK also includes Jamshidis, Taimanis, Firozkohis, Teymurs. ORMURI
includes Parachi. There are two districts for which ethnic information is not available.
POPULATION is in thousands of people. AREA is in thousands of square km. LIGHT is a index
of nightime light emissions. LATITUDE and LONGITUDE are in degrees. ROADS is the number
of major roads in the district. RIVERS is the total length of rivers in the district.
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have historically found themselves in conict with the Taliban, and were participants
in the Northern Alliance.
With respect to other characteristics of districts, there is more group activity in
districts with more roads, particularly the ring road artery connecting Kabul with
other provincial capitals. As in Figure 1a, which shows raw total attacks, Appendix
Figure A.3a shows graphically that organized attacks are concentrated in Pashtun-
majority areas, and also near the main highway passing through Kabul and other
cities.50 A feature that is apparent in Appendix Figure A.3a, however, that does
not show up clearly in the raw attack data of Figure 1a is that there appears to be
a substantial organized insurgency operating near the highway north of Kabul, as
well as the highway running south from it. This area is not as heavily populated by
Pashtuns, and perhaps because of this, the number of total attacks is not as high.
The attack covariance matrix, however, reveals that the attacks that did occur appear
to exhibit substantial coordination.
4.3.1 Changes in group structure across time
The econometric model outlined so far assumes that the extent and prevalence of
the organized insurgent group remains constant across time. This section considers
how we can relax this strong assumption and, in the process, reveal novel information
on the organization and strategy of the insurgents.
A formal model that allows for this structure to change over time appears chal-
lenging to develop. An informal analysis of potential changes can be conducted,
however, by appropriately splitting the data. Specically, we create an \early" data
set, including only attacks in 2004-2007, and a \late" data set, including only attacks
in 2008-2009.51 The total daily number of attacks is substantially higher in the later
period compared to the earlier one.52 Estimates of the prevalence of organized insur-
50Estimates based on non-negative matrix factorization, shown in Appendix Figure A.4a, appear
to make it slightly clearer that the majority of organized insurgent activity is on the ring highway
passing through Kabul, and that this activity extends to the north as well as the south of Kabul,
possibly with the goal of isolating it. Estimates of the prevalence of the organized group can be
produced using the method in Section 2.5. As the estimates in this case are eectively based only on
variation within months, estimates appear slightly noisier. These estimates are shown in Appendix
Figure A.4b. The tendency towards organized insurgent activity along the main highway can still
be seen, although it is no longer as clear.
51The informal nature of this analysis is due to the fact that the cut point of January 1, 2008, was
chosen based on qualitative information: the econometric model is not one of structural breaks.
52The distribution of these attacks is shown in Appendix Figure A.2. The unied Taliban orga-
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Table 7: Dep. variable is sum of o-diagonal entries of cov. matrix for district i
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
(Intercept) 2:57 1:86 0:18  2:28 3:83 3:93 1:87  0:36
(0:19) (0:75) (0:62) (0:96) (0:12) (0:54) (0:38) (0:83)
UZBEK  0:56  0:20  1:06  0:08  1:17  0:98  1:57  0:98
(0:38) (0:73) (0:39) (0:71) (0:36) (0:55) (0:41) (0:69)
BALOCH  1:78  2:65  1:93  1:55  2:24  2:80  2:19  1:57
(1:49) (1:42) (1:47) (1:34) (0:93) (1:03) (1:07) (1:09)
HAZARA  1:46  2:27  2:14  2:44  0:75  0:71  1:17  0:74
(0:38) (0:54) (0:40) (0:73) (0:61) (0:61) (0:66) (0:65)
TAJIK  0:89  0:19  1:33  0:35  0:44  0:26  0:81  0:26
(0:38) (0:78) (0:37) (0:62) (0:29) (0:81) (0:28) (0:47)
PAMIR.TAJIK 0:97 3:77 1:95 4:49  0:35 3:66 0:20 4:28
(0:22) (0:81) (0:44) (0:74) (0:13) (0:88) (0:32) (0:61)
ORMURI 1:64  0:28 1:05  1:64 0:61  0:18 0:24  1:55
(0:87) (0:44) (0:62) (0:69) (0:75) (0:28) (0:54) (0:70)
NURISTANI  1:45 0:51  0:94 0:91  3:02  0:76  1:85  0:43
(1:21) (0:32) (1:37) (2:05) (1:31) (0:19) (1:13) (1:06)
logPOP 0:52 0:73 0:43 0:59
(0:17) (0:19) (0:09) (0:13)
logAREA 0:38 0:18 0:28 0:19
(0:13) (0:16) (0:08) (0:12)
logROADS 0:55 0:59 0:43 0:60
(0:23) (0:26) (0:17) (0:17)
logRIVERS  0:22  0:13  0:03  0:01
(0:09) (0:13) (0:07) (0:09)
PROV Y Y Y Y
N 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
R2 0:06 0:24 0:18 0:35
adj. R2 0:04 0:10 0:15 0:22
Resid. sd 1:93 1:86 1:82 1:74
Columns I - IV use OLS with dependent variable log transformed
Columns V - VIII use GLM/Poisson allowing for overdispersion
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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gents from the earlier data can be compared to estimates from the later data, yielding
a description of how the structure and location of insurgent groups has changed over
time.
Appendix Figure A.3b shows an estimate of the number of attacks due to organized
insurgent groups in the earlier period, while Appendix Figure A.3c shows this for the
later period. Comparing the two gures shows how much gain in territorial control and
coordination have been characteristic of the Taliban oensive since 2008.53 Appendix
Figure A.3b shows a lower frequency of attacks overall, and most districts that do
see a high frequency of attacks are near the main highway to the south and west of
Kabul. Appendix Figure A.3c shows a higher frequency of attacks, and also shows
districts in the north with high frequencies of attacks. One example of this is the
highway north of Kabul, where now a number of districts with high frequencies of
attacks appears.
A statistical analysis of changes in the distribution of attacks does reveal some
patterns that are statistically signicant and of relevance for current eorts in the
management of the conict. Appendix Table A.3 investigates the correlates of insur-
gent group control in each district in the early and late periods by stacking the set
of districts and employing interactions with POST dummy for the 2008-09 period.
Control by the insurgents is measured through the sum of o-diagonal entries of the
covariance matrix of attacks for district i according to the approximation in Equation
6.
As in Table 7, the results in Appendix Table A.3 show a clear relationship between
ethnicity and simultaneous attacks. Appendix Table A.3 reports coecients for seven
ethnic group dummy variables (indicating the largest ethnic group in the district),
with Pashtun as the omitted dummy variable.54 The coecient in the POST inter-
nization is detectable in both the early and the complete samples, with one group of insurgents.
The coordinated and unied behavior of the Taliban is not a feature developing over time, rather
it is present from the onset. This shows that our results are not due purely to the August 2009
presidential election, when there were many attacks on and around election day. While there is
substantial evidence that many of these attacks were in fact coordinated by the Taliban, it would
be worrisome if the results presented thus far changed drastically when the attacks around the 2009
elections were excluded. These results are available on request.
53The colors of the gures are aligned so that the same color indicates the same number of attacks
per capita per year, although the \early" and \late" data have a dierent number of months.
54For interpreting the table, recall that the Afghan Taliban are traditionally ethnically Pashtun
and follow Sunni Islam. Their historical opposition to Uzbeks, Hazara, and Tajiks { the main ethnic
minorities in Afghanistan { is well documented. It is therefore not surprising that our measure
of Taliban activity in Afghan districts is negatively correlated with dummy variables indicating
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action with the ethnicity variables is generally positive and of magnitude between
25 and 70 percent of the main eect: districts with non-Pashtun ethnicities exhibit
relatively greater activity in the later period, indicating a substantial penetration of
the Taliban into areas previously outside their reach.55
4.3.2 An Oil-Spot Strategy
Krepinevich [2005] discusses a state of the art counterinsurgency doctrine where
control is expanded gradually across space. This is sometimes referred to an \oil
spot" strategy, as the area controlled expands contiguously like an oil stain.56 Our
methodology allows us to ask a reverse question, regarding the strategy of insurgents:
over time, how do attacks expand across space? Do the Taliban appear in completely
new and disconnected areas, or do they launch attacks in districts that are adjacent
to those that they were operating in previously? We conclude that the Taliban follow
an \oil spot" insurgency strategy based on gradual expansion.
We begin by calculating, for each district, the estimated number of attacks by
organized groups in adjacent districts, following Equation 6. The results of this
calculation are shown in Appendix Figure A.5: the districts where this variable is
zero are shown in blue.57 All but one of these blue districts are also not estimated to
have any organized attacks in the later period, as can be seen by comparing Appendix
Figure A.3c with Appendix Figure A.5. In particular, there were no attacks in the
central part of Afghanistan in the early period, or much of the northeast, and these
areas similarly do not have any attacks in the later period. On the other hand,
districts immediately adjacent to estimated early Taliban strongholds appear prone
to insurgent expansion.
non-Pashtun ethnicity.
55Consider for instance the case of the Uzbeks in Column II: the main eect is a statistically
signicant  2:11, indicating a much lower penetration of the Taliban in Uzbek areas in 2004-2007.
In the 2008-09 period Uzbek districts are still less likely to experience Taliban activity, but now
the coecient falls by more than half, to  0:76 (=  2:11 + 1:35). The distinction between Uzbek
and Pashtun districts is thus decreased in the later period. In Column IV, where we exploit within-
province variation, the distinction between Uzbek and Pashtun districts disappears completely or
even reverses (0:3 =  1:05+1:35). Although less statistically precise, Tajik and Hazara areas appear
to display a similar pattern.
56This strategy appears to date back to the 19th century, as part of French colonial doctrine.
Potiron de Boiseury [2010] provides a detailed historical account.
57As in previous gures showing estimates of organized group activity, the units for \number of
attacks" shown in the legend here are arbitrary, and thus only relative comparisons can be made.
40
Appendix Table A.6 shows that this qualitative pattern is statistically signicant.
The basic specication used here is
ATTACKS LATEi = 0 + 1ATTACKS EARLYi
+21(ATTACKS EARLY ADJACENTi = 0) + i
where ATTACKS LATE is the number of attacks estimated to be due to organized
insurgents in the later period, and ATTACKS EARLY this number for the earlier
period. ATTACKS EARLY ADJACENT is the average number of attacks in geo-
graphically adjacent districts. This last variable is used only as indicator variable:
are there an estimated positive number of attacks attributed to organized groups in
adjacent districts?58 Columns I-III of Appendix Table A.6 show that districts where
there was no insurgent group activity in the early period are less likely to experience
insurgent group activity in the later period, and that this result is robust to a variety
of controls, including province xed eects.59
5 Insurgency Organization & Economic Recovery
This section briey discusses case studies chosen to highlight the economic impor-
tance of understanding insurgent organization in conict and post-conict environ-
ments. We focus on three dierent episodes: Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
58The dummy recoding is used because there is a long-standing problem in the analysis of spatial
data regarding how to use this type of \adjacent observations" data, and there does not appear to
be a satisfactory solution in this case.
59Based on the denition of organized group attacks in Section 2, there should never be a negative
number of attacks attributed to organized group members. Columns IV-VI of Appendix Table A.6
thus present the same analysis using a Poisson GLM model, in order to take this non-negativity
into account. The estimated number of attacks attributed to organized group members are non-
integer, but this does not cause a problem for generalized linear models of the sort used. An
additional advantage of the Poisson model is that districts with few attacks are (correctly) treated
as having higher variance relative to mean (weighted least squares could also be used here, but the
Poisson model is natural as the underlying attack data is positive integers). The results in Columns
IV-VI conrm that there is very little organized insurgent activity in the late period in districts
that did not border a district with such activity in the early period. The large coecient on the
ATTACKS EARLY ADJACENT indicator variable is due to the fact that the data exhibits \almost"
complete separation: if there were zero districts rather than one that saw organized insurgent activity
in the late period without any adjacent activity in the early period, the estimated coecient here
would be negative innity, and it would not be possible to calculate standard errors by standard
methods.
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Insurgent groups owe their success to their deep ties with noncombatant popula-
tions. By impeding reconstruction eorts, they can fuel popular dissatisfaction with
central authorities, thereby maintaining a steady ow of recruits and ensuring logis-
tic assistance for their agents. Insurgencies thus have a particular incentive to delay
aggregate economic recovery.
In Iraq, insurgents disrupted the electricity grid and seized control of oil resources.
Henderson [2005] describes the loop that linked insecurity and economic stagnation:
Inability to provide security had a profound impact on Iraq's economic
recovery. In turn, inability to provide recovery had a profound impact on
Iraq's security. Reconstruction delays fed into Iraqi feelings of resentment
and despair, which fueled insurgency and crime, thereby worsening the
security climate.
The connection of the study of insurgency with economic development comes from
this tight link between insurgent strategies and the failure of reconstruction eorts.
Understanding the exact nature of the Iraqi insurgency early on in the conict could
have proven crucial in breaking the vicious cycle that Henderson [2005] observes.60
Uncertainty about the organization of the insurgency in post-2003 Iraq took sev-
eral forms. First, there was disagreement regarding the extent to which attacks
represented an insurgency at all.61 There was also confusion regarding its magnitude:
as late as the fall of 2004, the U.S. military still attributed 80 percent of attacks to
random and not to political violence. Finally, there was heated debate about the or-
ganization of the insurgency, once it was clear that one existed.62 Further complexity
in the Iraqi case stemmed from signs of evolution over time, as the New York Times
60Henderson is critical of the strategy actually used: \as violence worsened, the response of coali-
tion ocials in charge of reconstruction was not to nd a way to ght it more eectively. Instead,
their response was to withdraw into the heavily protected world of the Green Zone."
61Eisenstadt and White [2005] write that \In the summer of 2003, Secretary of Defense Don-
ald Rumsfeld and General John Abizaid (head of U.S. Central Command) publicly disagreed about
whether the violence in the Sunni Triangle was the nal act of former regime \dead-enders" or an
incipient insurgency against the emerging political order". There was a similar disagreement in 2005
between Vice President Richard Cheney and General Abizaid.
62The New York Times quotes senior U.S. intelligence sources stating that \It's not just one group
of insurgents rallying under one cause. It's multiple groups with dierent causes loosely tied together
by the threads of anti-U.S. sentiment, some sort of Iraqi nationalism, Muslim-Arab unity or greed".
The lack of familiarity with this type of enemy appeared evident:\What makes it more dicult is
that you're dealing with an insurgency without a single face".
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reported: \the insurgency was now organized regionally, and that evidence pointed to
some planning across regional boundaries".63
The diculty, and the importance, of understanding the structure of insurgencies
is not limited to Iraq. Consider recent Western eorts in Syria: \Sixteen months into
the uprising in Syria, the United States is struggling to develop a clear understanding
of opposition forces inside the country, according to U.S. ocials who said that in-
telligence gaps have impeded eorts to support the ouster of Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad."64
Beginning with a series of pro-democracy protests in 2011, the situation in Syria
quickly escalated into a full-blown civil war that has cost 250; 000 lives and displaced
almost 11 million Syrian citizens to the beginning of 2016. In the backdrop of a
ethnically and religiously divided population, this conict quickly displayed a high
degree of complexity in the heterogeneity of parties involved [Smith, 2012], including
the Syrian state army loyal to Bashar al-Assad, Sunni Syrian rebels, the Islamic
State, Jabhat al-Nusra, Kurdish forces, and Hezbollah. Lack of understanding of
the structure of the insurgency in Syria has been one of the strongest deterrents to
military and humanitarian involvement of Western powers in this conict [Jenkins,
2014] and slowed down relief eorts.
Western countries were willing to lend support and provide prompt international
aid to moderate Sunni organizations, but the diculty laid in identifying these rebels
and their true organizational linkages. The impossibility of separating the secular
moderates from the religious extremists among the Sunni opponents of the Alawite-
led government resulted in international paralysis. This led to further economic and
social deterioration, radicalization, and escalation of the conict. Syria is now a
nearly failed state, fought over by Assad loyalists, the Islamic State, and the al-
Qaeda aliated Nusra front. Numerous attempts at a political solution by the Arab
League and the United Nations have failed.
Another relevant case is Libya post-Colonel Gadda. This event would require
in itself a fully accurate discussion, but as above for Iraq and Syria, we try to pro-
vide a basic picture from the perspective of the analysis of multi-group conicts.
After 2011 and the violent overthrowing of the Gadda regime, Libya gradually de-
63http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/22/international/middleeast/22insurgents.html?pagewanted=2& r=0
64http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-syria-conict-us-struggles-to-ll-
intelligence-gaps/2012/07/23/gJQAW8DG5W story.html
43
scended into full-blown factional violence with Islamic State factions jockeying for
control of oil rich areas together with two main armed groups: the Tobruk govern-
ment (elected democratically but in a deeply unstable political environment) and
the Muslim Brotherhood-supported General National Congress. To further compli-
cate the picture, other ethnic-based groups, like the Touareg, have also laid claim to
certain parts of the former Libyan state. Repeated failures to achieve stable Unity
governments and substantial ambiguity in the set of alliances struck among the vari-
ous groups have severely hindered the pacication response led by the United Nations
in the region. While the United Nations and the European Union have been holding
o decisive intervention, the east/west divide in the country has been increasingly
exacerbating.
6 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the empirical analysis of insurgency, with applications to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Often the only type of data available concerning the level
and geographical diusion of insurgent activity comes from incident-level data on
insurgent attacks. However limited such information might be, recent advances in
the analysis of the economics of conict and reconstruction in war zones have been
possible thanks to this data.65
This paper shows how incident-level data contains information that can be em-
ployed to estimate the structure and geographic span of inuence of insurgent groups.
We present a set of methods to detect unobserved insurgent coalition structures, based
on co-occurrences of violent incidents across districts over time. If incidents in two
districts occur simultaneously more than would be expected by random chance, then
this suggests that these districts share an organized insurgent movement, one capa-
ble of cross-district coordination. We then carry out an analysis of the spread and
frequency of attacks.
Progress in understanding insurgency is key in furthering our knowledge of the
determinants and consequences of political violence in developing countries. Although
much of the analysis in this paper is necessarily context-dependent, it is informative
nonetheless for regional stabilization and local development goals [Drozdova, 2012].
From a methodological perspective, our contributions have a more general appeal.
65Berman, Shapiro, and Felter [2011] is one recent example.
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Appendix Figure A.1: Afghan Ring Road
(via Wall Street Journal)
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Appendix Figure A.2: Afghanistan attacks by time period
(a) Attacks per capita 2004-2007
(b) Attacks per capita 2008-2009
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Appendix Figure A.3: Organized group members (Equation 6 approximation)
(a) full dataset (2004-2009)
(b) 2004-2007 period only (c) 2008-2009 period only
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Appendix Figure A.4: Organized group members: NNMF
(a) \Not by month"
(b) \By month" covariance matrix (Section 2.5)
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Appendix Figure A.5: (Estimated) attacks by organized group members (2004-2007,
average over adjacent districts)
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Appendix Table A.1: Afghanistan timeline 2001-2011
18-Sep-01 President George W. Bush signs into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those
responsible for attacking the United States on 9/11.
7-Oct-01 The U.S. military, with British support, begins a bombing campaign against Taliban
Nov-01 The Taliban regime unravels rapidly after its loss at Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9th
Dec-01 Osama bin Laden escapes from Tora Bora
5-Dec-01 Hamid Karzai is installed as interim administration head after the Bonn Agreement
9-Dec-01 The Taliban surrender Kandahar, their regime collapses.
17-Apr-02 U.S. Congress appropriates over $38 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to
Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009.
1-May-03 U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declares an end to "major combat."
8-Aug-03 NATO assumes control of international security forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan
Jan-04 Afghan Constitution is approved.
9-Oct-04 Hamid Karzai is popularly elected as president.
29-Oct-04 Osama bin Laden releases a videotaped message three weeks after the country's presidential election.
18-Sep-05 Legislative elections in Afghanistan for the Wolesi Jirga (Council of People) and the Meshrano Jirga
(Council of Elders)
Jul-06 Violence increases across the country, including suicide attacks.
Nov-06 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticizes NATO countries in late 2007 for not sending more
soldiers.
22-Aug-08 Afghan civilian casualties mount. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal orders an overhaul of U.S. air strike
procedures.
17-Feb-09 New U.S. president Barack Obama announces plans to send seventeen thousand more troops to
Afghanistan. Reinforcements focus on countering a "resurgent" Taliban and stemming the ow of
foreign ghters over the Afghan-Pakistan border in the south.
27-Mar-09 New American strategy focused on disrupting Taliban safe havens in Pakistan
11-May-09 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates replaces the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David
D. McKiernan, with counterinsurgency and special operations guru Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal.
Jul-09 U.S. Marines launch a major oensive in southern Afghanistan (Helmand Province), representing
a major test for the U.S. military's new counterinsurgency strategy.
Nov-09 Hamid Karzai is popularly re-elected as president.
1-Dec-09 President Obama announces a major escalation of the U.S. mission, an Afghan surge.
23-Jun-10 Gen. Stanley McChrystal is relieved of his post as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan
1-May-11 Osama bin Laden killed in Pakistan
Jun-11 President Obama outlines a plan to withdraw troops according to NATO plans of complete with-
drawn by 2014
7-Oct-11 10 years of counterinsurgency war. 1,800 U.S. troop casualties and $444 billion in spending
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018
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Appendix Table A.2: Dependent variable is total attacks for district i
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
(Intercept) 2:58 1:96 0:23  1:97 3:37 3:98 1:02  0:97
(0:11) (0:82) (0:32) (0:71) (0:14) (0:61) (0:34) (0:77)
UZBEK  1:65  1:36  2:04  1:30  2:17  1:74  2:70  2:15
(0:24) (0:47) (0:22) (0:44) (0:29) (0:51) (0:33) (0:50)
BALOCH  2:02  3:03  1:59  1:50  2:38  3:29  1:93  1:71
(0:54) (0:43) (0:49) (0:48) (0:44) (0:38) (0:42) (0:41)
HAZARA  1:71  1:72  2:21  1:73  1:72  1:31  2:12  1:18
(0:26) (0:38) (0:28) (0:33) (0:43) (0:53) (0:43) (0:51)
TAJIK  1:12  0:52  1:58  0:66  0:82  0:05  1:22  0:41
(0:24) (0:55) (0:21) (0:38) (0:40) (0:91) (0:38) (0:49)
PAMIR.TAJIK 0:16 2:01 0:72 2:36  0:64 2:45 0:02 2:80
(0:13) (0:57) (0:28) (0:45) (0:14) (0:93) (0:33) (0:60)
ORMURI 0:85 0:61 0:10  0:82  0:00 0:36  0:59  1:04
(0:51) (0:54) (0:24) (0:50) (0:28) (0:37) (0:20) (0:36)
NURISTANI  1:27  1:85  0:34  1:29  2:45  2:82  0:92  2:89
(0:50) (0:38) (0:60) (1:08) (0:56) (0:40) (0:52) (1:57)
logPOP 0:60 0:69 0:49 0:63
(0:08) (0:10) (0:08) (0:11)
logAREA 0:19  0:04 0:24 0:10
(0:07) (0:09) (0:07) (0:08)
logROADS 0:37 0:57 0:59 0:77
(0:16) (0:15) (0:15) (0:14)
logRIVERS  0:03 0:03  0:03  0:01
(0:06) (0:07) (0:08) (0:07)
PROV Y Y Y Y
N 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262
Columns I - IV use OLS with dependent variable log transformed
Columns V - VIII use GLM/Poisson allowing for overdispersion
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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Appendix Table A.3: Dep. var. is sum of o-diag. entries of cov. mat. for district i
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
(Intercept)  1:08  0:96  1:23  3:23 0:63 0:75 0:61  1:69
(0:40) (0:40) (0:50) (0:71) (0:36) (0:35) (0:38) (0:87)
POST 0:31 0:09 0:62 0:62 0:58 0:40 0:67 0:76
(0:15) (0:20) (0:79) (0:73) (0:15) (0:17) (0:62) (0:63)
UZBEK  1:44  2:11  2:11  1:05  1:54  3:28  3:34  2:44
(0:27) (0:31) (0:30) (0:50) (0:40) (0:65) (0:67) (0:76)
BALOCH  1:02  1:54  1:05  0:93  1:90  2:45  2:23  1:56
(0:89) (0:63) (0:60) (0:71) (0:84) (0:68) (0:68) (0:77)
HAZARA  1:82  1:98  1:92  1:73  1:05  2:20  2:18  1:85
(0:32) (0:36) (0:38) (0:49) (0:60) (0:44) (0:45) (0:50)
TAJIK  1:39  1:62  1:68  0:66  0:84  1:00  1:03  0:57
(0:23) (0:30) (0:29) (0:47) (0:25) (0:38) (0:38) (0:48)
PAMIR.TAJIK 1:92 2:03 1:88 3:60 0:34 0:64 0:60 4:43
(0:35) (0:31) (0:38) (0:63) (0:40) (0:29) (0:35) (0:93)
ORMURI  0:12 0:82 0:60  1:66 0:17  0:26  0:36  2:37
(1:24) (0:32) (0:36) (0:75) (0:57) (0:20) (0:19) (0:82)
NURISTANI  0:53 0:11 0:47 1:49  2:35  1:11  0:77 0:51
(0:76) (1:00) (0:95) (1:22) (1:23) (0:97) (0:91) (0:82)
logPOP 0:60 0:60 0:70 0:85 0:44 0:44 0:45 0:64
(0:11) (0:11) (0:13) (0:14) (0:09) (0:08) (0:09) (0:14)
logAREA 0:25 0:25 0:14 0:03 0:26 0:26 0:24 0:16
(0:08) (0:08) (0:09) (0:12) (0:07) (0:07) (0:08) (0:12)
logROADS 0:44 0:44 0:46 0:55 0:39 0:39 0:58 0:71
(0:16) (0:16) (0:20) (0:21) (0:15) (0:16) (0:20) (0:23)
logRIVERS  0:08  0:08 0:01 0:10  0:03  0:03 0:00 0:02
(0:07) (0:07) (0:08) (0:09) (0:07) (0:06) (0:08) (0:10)
POST:UZBEK 1:35 1:35 1:35 2:22 2:29 2:09
(0:51) (0:52) (0:52) (0:77) (0:80) (0:65)
POST:BALOCH 1:04 0:06 0:06 0:80 0:43 0:34
(1:48) (1:48) (1:45) (1:23) (1:27) (1:30)
POST:HAZARA 0:32 0:19 0:19 1:53 1:50 1:55
(0:60) (0:65) (0:53) (0:80) (0:85) (0:70)
POST:TAJIK 0:46 0:57 0:57 0:26 0:31 0:36
(0:45) (0:46) (0:41) (0:51) (0:50) (0:46)
POST:PAMIR.TAJIK  0:21 0:09 0:09  0:59  0:53  0:55
(0:23) (0:60) (0:50) (0:18) (0:54) (0:52)
POST:ORMURI  1:88  1:43  1:43 0:64 0:81 0:99
(1:97) (1:95) (1:52) (0:86) (0:91) (0:77)
POST:NURISTANI  1:28  2:01  2:01  3:11  3:74  2:86
(1:60) (1:65) (1:48) (2:68) (2:81) (1:99)
POST:logPOP  0:20  0:20  0:02  0:05
(0:21) (0:20) (0:15) (0:15)
POST:logAREA 0:23 0:23 0:03 0:04
(0:15) (0:14) (0:13) (0:14)
POST:logROADS  0:03  0:03  0:29  0:26
(0:33) (0:29) (0:30) (0:29)
POST:logRIVERS  0:18  0:18  0:04  0:04
(0:13) (0:12) (0:12) (0:12)
N 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524
Columns I - IV use OLS with dependent variable log transformed. Column IV has province xed eects.
Columns V - VIII use GLM/Poisson allowing for overdispersion. Column VIII has province xed eects.
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Appendix Table A.4: Dependent variable is o diagonal covariance matrix entry i i0
I II III IV
POST 0.234 0.905 0.909 0.491
(0.032) (0.173) (0.173) (0.467)
UZBEK  2.431  2.433  1.472  1.703
(0.229) (0.229) (0.334) (0.352)
BALOCH  0.936  0.713  0.421  0.756
(0.773) (0.775) (0.701) (0.718)
HAZARA  2.490  2.476  2.310  1.741
(0.269) (0.269) (0.325) (0.331)
TAJIK  1.454  1.525  0.538  0.604
(0.166) (0.167) (0.238) (0.244)
PAMIR.TAJIK 1.254 1.237 3.627 2.548
(0.832) (0.834) (0.909) (0.932)
ORMURI  0.182  0.278  1.866  1.058
(0.739) (0.739) (0.746) (0.754)
NURISTANI  0.104 0.114  0.404  1.065
(0.719) (0.719) (0.970) (0.992)
logPOP 0.479 0.530 0.638 0.633
(0.081) (0.082) (0.080) (0.082)
logAREA 0.194 0.167  0.004 0.019
(0.052) (0.053) (0.064) (0.066)
logROADS 0.368 0.428 0.540 0.518
(0.111) (0.113) (0.106) (0.107)
logRIVERS  0.079  0.047 0.018 0.072
(0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.057)
POST:UZBEK 1.364 1.364 1.365 1.637
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.190)
POST:BALOCH  0.180  0.529  0.530 0.027
(0.475) (0.479) (0.479) (0.501)
POST:HAZARA 1.020 0.992 0.994 0.252
(0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.167)
POST:TAJIK 0.382 0.483 0.485 0.561
(0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.098)
POST:PAMIR.TAJIK  0.487  0.471  0.470 1.606
(0.256) (0.265) (0.265) (0.761)
POST:ORMURI 0.500 0.650 0.651  0.533
(0.197) (0.199) (0.199) (0.250)
POST:NURISTANI 0.076  0.265  0.266 0.858
(0.302) (0.305) (0.305) (0.433)
POST:logPOP  0.081  0.082  0.071
(0.022) (0.022) (0.032)
POST:logAREA 0.042 0.042 0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.027)
POST:logROADS  0.095  0.095  0.053
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042)
POST:logRIVERS  0.047  0.047  0.120
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025)
Constant  6.889  7.303  11.288  11.044
(0.590) (0.601) (1.055) (1.085)
N 68,382 68,382 68,382 68,382
GLMM/Poisson allowing for overdispersion, with random eects at district level
Overdispersion modelled via random eects at observation level. Column IV has province xed eects.
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Appendix Table A.5: Dependent variable is total attacks in district i
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
(Intercept) 0:67 0:26  0:09  1:82 1:02 0:45 0:31  1:77
(0:28) (0:22) (0:28) (0:44) (0:34) (0:28) (0:37) (0:66)
UZBEK  1:74  1:85  1:85  1:24  2:70  3:27  3:23  2:64
(0:18) (0:16) (0:17) (0:29) (0:33) (0:43) (0:44) (0:45)
BALOCH  1:25  1:07  0:88  0:83  1:93  1:50  1:36  1:08
(0:34) (0:60) (0:57) (0:59) (0:42) (0:72) (0:73) (0:72)
HAZARA  1:84  1:58  1:58  1:13  2:12  2:15  2:11  1:18
(0:23) (0:23) (0:23) (0:23) (0:43) (0:39) (0:40) (0:37)
TAJIK  1:34  1:42  1:45  0:70  1:22  1:40  1:40  0:61
(0:18) (0:19) (0:19) (0:26) (0:38) (0:44) (0:45) (0:39)
PAMIR.TAJIK 0:54 0:69 0:75 1:84 0:02 0:17 0:21 3:04
(0:24) (0:18) (0:25) (0:39) (0:33) (0:27) (0:37) (0:60)
ORMURI 0:05  0:19  0:29  1:04  0:59  1:00  1:01  1:47
(0:22) (0:20) (0:23) (0:35) (0:20) (0:20) (0:23) (0:30)
NURISTANI  0:31  0:62  0:45  1:38  0:92  1:27  1:14  3:16
(0:46) (0:50) (0:52) (0:66) (0:52) (0:67) (0:68) (1:21)
logPOP 0:52 0:47 0:59 0:67 0:49 0:49 0:53 0:68
(0:07) (0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:08) (0:06) (0:09) (0:11)
logAREA 0:16 0:15 0:12  0:04 0:24 0:24 0:22 0:08
(0:06) (0:04) (0:06) (0:07) (0:07) (0:05) (0:08) (0:09)
logROADS 0:36 0:36 0:27 0:42 0:59 0:59 0:58 0:76
(0:13) (0:09) (0:13) (0:11) (0:15) (0:12) (0:17) (0:15)
logRIVERS  0:02  0:02 0:01 0:07  0:03  0:03  0:02  0:00
(0:05) (0:04) (0:06) (0:06) (0:08) (0:06) (0:09) (0:06)
POST  0:12 0:60 0:60  0:25 0:08 0:21
(0:13) (0:41) (0:40) (0:16) (0:49) (0:41)
POST:UZBEK 0:57 0:56 0:56 1:05 0:99 0:90
(0:22) (0:24) (0:23) (0:52) (0:53) (0:34)
POST:BALOCH  0:35  0:74  0:74  1:39  1:69  1:87
(0:83) (0:80) (0:82) (1:39) (1:39) (1:50)
POST:HAZARA  0:12  0:13  0:13 0:08  0:01 0:01
(0:29) (0:31) (0:23) (0:64) (0:64) (0:58)
POST:TAJIK 0:40 0:46 0:46 0:39 0:37 0:40
(0:26) (0:26) (0:22) (0:56) (0:56) (0:32)
POST:PAMIR.TAJIK  0:47  0:59  0:59  0:41  0:51  0:57
(0:13) (0:34) (0:29) (0:16) (0:49) (0:34)
POST:ORMURI 0:53 0:74 0:74 0:79 0:83 0:84
(0:24) (0:32) (0:23) (0:25) (0:30) (0:19)
POST:NURISTANI 0:69 0:35 0:35 0:72 0:42 0:51
(0:58) (0:62) (0:59) (0:77) (0:85) (1:09)
POST:logPOP  0:24  0:24  0:09  0:11
(0:11) (0:11) (0:12) (0:10)
POST:logAREA 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
(0:08) (0:07) (0:10) (0:09)
POST:logROADS 0:17 0:17 0:01 0:01
(0:18) (0:15) (0:23) (0:19)
POST:logRIVERS  0:06  0:06  0:02  0:01
(0:07) (0:06) (0:12) (0:07)
N 262 524 524 524 262 524 524 524
Columns I - IV use OLS with dependent variable log transformed. Column IV has province xed eects.
Columns V - VIII use GLM/Poisson allowing for overdispersion. Column VIII has province xed eects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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Appendix Table A.6: Estimated Organized Attacks, 2008-2009
I II III IV V VI
(Intercept)  1:31  1:23  11:78 0:48  4:11  8:59
(0:09) (2:71) (12:30) (0:14) (4:98) (21:03)
I(ATTACKS EARLY ADJACENT == 0)  0:95  0:69  0:49  4:71  4:39  3:67
(0:10) (0:12) (0:18) (1:02) (1:04) (1:11)
ATTACKS EARLY 0:78 0:68 0:69 0:34 0:28 0:34
(0:11) (0:11) (0:11) (0:07) (0:08) (0:13)
logPOP 0:27 0:24 0:54 0:61
(0:10) (0:13) (0:17) (0:23)
logAREA 0:08 0:06 0:22 0:10
(0:07) (0:10) (0:14) (0:17)
LIGHTS  0:71  0:63  1:94  1:04
(0:27) (0:29) (1:18) (1:30)
LATITUDE  0:17 0:01  0:18  0:27
(0:05) (0:17) (0:09) (0:41)
LONGITUDE 0:05 0:10 0:08 0:14
(0:03) (0:17) (0:05) (0:29)
Provice FE N N Y N N Y
N 398 398 398 398 398 398
R2 0:36 0:39 0:46
adj. R2 0:35 0:38 0:40
Resid. sd 1:41 1:38 1:36
Columns I-III use OLS with log(ATTACKS+0.1) as dependent variable
Columns IV-VI use Poisson regression with ATTACKS as dependent variable
ATTACKS EARLY is (estimated) number of organized attacks in 2004 - 2007.
ATTACKS EARLY ADJACENT is (est.) # of organized attacks per capita in adj. districts in 2004-2007.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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Appendix Table A.7: Estimated Organized Attacks, '08-'09 (no attacks in '04-'07)
I II III IV V VI
(Intercept)  1:93 2:60 20:39  0:93 14:67 106:11
(0:07) (2:38) (12:69) (0:43) (7:82) (42:20)
I(ATTACKS EARLY ADJACENT == 0)  0:34  0:15  0:13  3:29  2:61  1:78
(0:08) (0:08) (0:12) (1:10) (1:15) (1:26)
logPOP 0:10 0:02 0:62 0:02
(0:08) (0:09) (0:38) (0:52)
logAREA 0:01 0:02  0:32 0:44
(0:05) (0:06) (0:40) (0:58)
LIGHTS  0:29  0:12  7:43  1:52
(0:13) (0:15) (7:62) (3:00)
LATITUDE  0:10  0:10  0:46  1:50
(0:04) (0:09) (0:19) (0:82)
LONGITUDE  0:03  0:28  0:10  0:81
(0:03) (0:17) (0:11) (0:51)
Provice FE N N Y N N Y
N 235 235 235 235 235 235
R2 0:03 0:09 0:50
adj. R2 0:02 0:06 0:40
Resid. sd 0:87 0:85 0:69
Sample is districts with zero (estimated) number of organized attacks in 2004-2007.
Columns I-III use OLS with log(ATTACKS+0.1) as dependent variable
Columns IV-VI use Poisson regression with ATTACKS as dependent variable
ATTACKS EARLY is (estimated) number of organized attacks in 2004 - 2007.
ATTACKS EARLY ADJACENT is (est.) # of organized attacks per capita in adj. districts in 2004-2007.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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B Recoverability of Low-Rank Matrix
We are interested in the conditions under which the  ^L resulting from (3) will be
a consistent estimator for  L. It is clear that there are some matrices  L for which
the proposed method will be inconsistent:
Example 1. Suppose that there are three districts, and two groups. Group member-
ships are 1 = (1; 0; ) and 2 = (0; 1; ), and thus
 L =
266664
1 0 
0 1 
  22
377775
for some small value . Suppose that there are disorganized insurgents such that
 D = I3. The minimum trace heuristic of (3), will then give an estimate
 ^L =
266664
 0 
0  
  2
377775
which has lower trace than the true  L so long as  is small.
It is thus important to provide conditions for the matrix  L such that the proposed
method gives a consistent estimator. Saunderson et al. [2012] give such a character-
ization. First, Saunderson et al. [2012] dene a subspace U as realizable if, for any
 L having column space U , and any  D, the minimum trace factorization algorithm
of (3) applied to   =  D +  L returns  ^L =  L. Next, they dene the \coherence"
(U) of a subspace U of Rn as
(16) (U) = max
i2f1;2;:::ng
jjPUeijj
where ei are the standard basis vectors, and PU is the orthogonal projection matrix
onto U . They then provide the following sucient condition:
Theorem 2 (Saunderson et al. 2012). If U is a subspace of Rn and (U) < 1=2, then
U is realizable.
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From an intuitive perspective, this restriction on coherence is equivalent to nothing
in the column space of  L being too close to the standard basis vectors. In the context
of estimating insurgent groups, the standard basis vectors represent groups that are
only present in one district. It makes sense that groups of this sort will result in
the procedure in (3) being inconsistent: a group that is only present in one district
is indistinguishable from disorganized insurgents, as they both only appear in the
diagonal entries of the covariance matrix.
Saunderson et al. [2012] also provide a further result, regarding the \realizability
of random subspaces". They argue that \most" subspaces of dimension less than
n=2 are realizable. The intuition here appears to be that a random subspace of
low dimension is unlikely to include anything close to a standard basis vector. In
general, then, if the number of groups is small relative to the number of districts,
the heuristic given in (3) will provide a consistent estimator for the group structure.
Cases where the estimator will not be consistent are those where one of the groups is
overwhelmingly located in a single district.
C Spectral Clustering Estimator
Spectral clustering is based on the \graph Laplacian" matrix
(17) L = D    L
where D is a diagonal matrix with entries equal to the row sums of  L. The graph
Laplacian thus has o-diagonal entries equal to the negative of those of the adjacency
matrix, and diagonal entries such that all rows and columns sum to zero. The graph
Laplacian L has a rank ofN J , and thus has J zero eigenvalues.66 Spectral clustering
focusses on the number of zero eigenvalues for the associated graph Laplacian matrix
66The number of zero eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian matrix corresponds to the number of
connected components of the weighted undirected graph described by the adjacency matrix  L. This
is J , the number of blocks of  L.
The intuition for this result is relatively straightforward. Each  jL block has rank one. The
corresponding block of the diagonal matrix D has full rank. Setting the entries in this diagonal
matrix so that rows and columns of the graph Laplacian L sum to zero ensures that the rows (and
columns) of L corresponding to each  jL block are linearly dependent. The  
j
L block that was
subtracted, however, is only rank one, and thus the null space of the resulting block of L must be
rank one. This is true for every block in L, and thus the null space of L has dimension J . This will
also be the number of zero eigenvalues of L.
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L, whereas the method used in the main text produces an estimate J^ of the number
of insurgent groups by examining (in a very broad sense) the rank of  L.
If  L were known, the number of organized groups could be calculated immedi-
ately, and it would equal both the rank of  L and the number of zero eigenvalues of
L. However, the data available gives the sample covariances ii0 rather than the true
ii0 , and thus a noisy  ^L must be used instead of the true  L. The simplest option
for actually implementing a spectral clustering approach is to use a modication of
Shi and Malik [2000]: use   to construct L, and then count the \zero" eigenvalues of
L.
In a nite sample, however, these eigenvalues calculated from L are subject to
nite sample variation. In particular, random variation will result in positive ii0
entries in some cases where the true ii0 is zero, and negative ii0 entries in some cases
where the true ii0 is positive. This random variation will tend to increase the rank of
the L relative to L. This problem is particularly severe for districts i for which there
are few attacks: the data provides little information on the group structure in these
districts, and if one object of interest is J , the total number of groups, the inclusion
of these particularly noisy districts could result in a substantial amount of additional
noise in the estimate J^ .
A similar problem aects the approach presented in the main text, which is based
on using the the largest eigenvalues (or other components) of  ^L. Finite sample
variation will also aect these eigenvalues. The question thus arises whether it is
better to use  ^L directly, or instead use the corresponding graph Laplacian matrix
L. Direct use of  ^L requires condence that the trace minimization algorithm in (3)
will work well in nite samples, while use of L avoids this issue because the diagonal
entries in question are subtracted away and thus are irrelevant. On the other hand,
using L requires labelling some eigenvalues as \zero" eigenvalues, despite the fact that
due to random noise all eigenvalues will probably be non-zero.67 A particular concern
here is that the eigenvalues in question are the smallest out of N eigenvalues. Monte
Carlo exercises (available upon request) suggest that the approach based on using
 ^L directly has better nite sample performance. We thus use this approach in our
analysis, as described in the main text. Below, we briey discuss how the alternative
67Eigenvalues that would be zero asymptotically will not be zero in a nite sample, because some
of the entries that are zero in  L will be positive in the calculated  ^L. When using a covariance
matrix that includes this nite sample variation, it is thus necessary to account for the fact that
eigenvalues that are zero in the population may not be zero in the sample.
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approach (based on the smallest eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian) might be applied.
A heuristic method is available based on \eigengaps" similar to those used by
Ng, Jordan, and Weiss [2002]. Sort the eigenvalues  of L in increasing order, such
that 1 is the smallest and N the largest.
68 The dierence k+1   k is dened the
kth eigengap. Ng, Jordan, and Weiss [2002] argue that a large eigengap indicates
that perturbation of the eigenvectors of L would not change the clusters produced
by spectral clustering. Luxburg [2007] thus suggests that the right choice for J^ is
a number such that k is \small" for k  J^ , and the J^th eigengap is large.69 The
intuition here is that if there truly are J^ eigenvalues that are zero, then these appear
to be non-zero in the nite sample only due to random variation. In contrast, the
J^ +1th and larger eigenvalues would be strictly positive even if the true L were used.
An examination of the J^th eigengap thus provides a heuristic test of whether the
choice of J^ was reliable, or whether small changes due to random variation might
result in a dierent number of zero eigenvalues.
Using this approach, the estimated J^ corresponds to an eigenvalue such that k
is \small" for all k  J^ . The presence of high eigengaps for very high values of k is
not relevant for the eigengap procedure, so long as Jmax is lower than these values.
Luxburg [2007] suggests that the cuto between \small" and \large" should not be
larger than the minimum degree in the graph. This is trivially met by J^ = 1, but
would be violated by any much larger estimate. Although the \eigengap" approach is
intended to be heuristic rather than formal, it is possible to compare the rst eigengap
to simulated data where there is no group structure. Compared to data where the
attacks in each district have been reassigned to a random date, the rst eigengap
in the actual Afghanistan attack data is larger, and this dierence is statistically
signicant at the 95% level.
More formal tests could also be constructed. Each o-diagonal ii0 entry will
converges to ii0 as the number of time periods grows, and the  L matrix will converge
to  L. Thus, L will converge to L. Asymptotically, the correct number of the sample
68A rst step to dealing with the problem of nite sample is to exclude districts with very few
attacks from estimation: for the analysis of the Afghan data, we used data only for those districts in
which there were 3 or more attacks (other cutos yielded similar results). This approach does not
fully solve the underlying issue, however. For simplicity the notation here assumes that no districts
are excluded on this basis and thus there are still N districts, and N eigenvalues.
69The underlying diculty here is determining what exactly constitutes a \zero" eigenvalue, when
there is nite sample variation. The presence of a large eigengap would thus provide some conr-
mation that an appropriate denition of \zero" has been chosen.
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eigenvalues of L will approach zero. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, a test
statistic similar to that given in Yao, Zheng, and Bai [2015] could be used to determine
the number of zero eigenvalues. This test statistic appears to have originated from
Anderson [1963], and a simplied version appears to be appropriate in this case: the
eigenvalues that are converging to zero are doing so at a
p
T rate, and thus for the
K smallest eigenvalues, the test statistic
p
T
PK
k=1 k or T
PK
k=1 
2
k could be used.
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Unfortunately, the asymptotic distribution of these test statistics is not clear,
and it is also not obvious that a subsampling bootstrap approach would yield the
correct distribution either. Simulations suggest that there are certain cases where the
correct number of groups will only be obtained with high probability when a very
large number of time periods are observed. Specically, consider the case where ij is
positive but very close to zero for some i and j. That is, there are members of group j
in district i, but there are very few of them. In this case ii0 will be very close to zero
for all the other i0 that contain members of group j. It is thus dicult to distinguish
between i containing its own separate group, and i being a part of group j. This
suggests that a formal test following this approach might be dicult to implement.
D NNMF Consistency
Conditions under which  ^L will converge to  L have been discussed in Appendix
B. We now consider conditions under which a non-negative matrix factorization of
 L will recover the fijg group structure. It is clear that the index numbering of
the groups cannot be recovered, because  L is invariant to relabelling of groups. The
index numbering of groups is irrelevant throughout our analysis, however, and thus
we are only concerned with whether the group structure can be recovered up to a
reindexing.
The question of recoverability can be broken down into two parts. First, is the
non-negative factorization of  L unique? Second, what is required for the approach
for estimating the number of groups, J^ to be consistent? We consider these questions
in turn.
Huang, Sidiropoulos, and Swami [2014] discuss uniqueness of symmetric non-
negative factorizations at some length. They conclude that while there are no obvious
70The asymptotic argument is made with a xed number of districts, N , and a growing number
of time periods, T .
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necessary conditions to check for uniqueness, simulations reveal that multiplicity of
solutions does not appear to be a problem unless the correct factorization is extremely
dense: factorizations with 80% non-zero entries are still reconstructed successfully.
The  L matrices considered in this paper would generally be expected to have a
relatively sparse factorization.
We now consider the approach for generating an estimate J^ for the number of
groups. Suppose that the true number of groups is J . If clustering is performed with
J+1 groups, the arrangement of these groups will be based on nite sample variation
in the attack covariance matrix. In expectation, Gap(J)  Gap(J + 1), but in any
given nite sample this may not be true. The method of estimating J^ given in the
main text, then, is not consistent as written, because regardless of the sample size, it
will sometimes be the case that Gap(J) < Gap(J + 1), and changes to the \rule of
thumb" sJ+1 cannot rectify the situation.
In general, the \gap statistic" literature focuses on clustering the sample actually
available, and does not emphasize consistency of the proposed estimators. In the
case considered in this paper, consistency would require two modications to basic
model presented. First, N would have to grow at some slow but non-zero rate:
the easiest way of handling this would be via inll asymptotics, where the country
in question were divided into progressively smaller districts. Second, the clustering
method employed should be hierarchical. This is because if number of groups is below
the true value of J , multiple groups will be clustered together. The way this occurs
will be determined by nite sample variation. It could be that at J=2, geographically
close groups are placed together, while at J=2 + 1, geographically distant groups are
placed together. Using a hierarchical clustering method would prevent this possibility.
We do not use such a method because implementation would be computationally more
challenging, and the problem just discussed does not appear to occur in the data we
use.71
71There are of course many other potential approaches. For example, at large sample sizes, one
could progressively revert to the \standard" Tibshirani, Walther, and Hastie [2001] setup, where the
gap statistic is calculated with respect to the same  L distance matrix that is used to perform the
clustering. In this case, For values k < J , Wk will converge to a positive value, so long as ik0 > 0
for at least two districts i and k0 > k. The main diculty would then be selecting a threshold such
that asymptotically k = J will be selected instead of k = J + 1 or K < J . Convergence of WJ and
WJ+1 would be at the standard
p
T rate, and thus any threshold that also shrinks at this rate will
lead to an inconsistent estimator: this includes any the rule of thumb \one standard error" rule from
Tibshirani, Walther and Hastie [2001], as the errors in the random model with no group structure
will also shrink at
p
T rate. The solution would be to use a threshold that shrinks to zero, but at
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E Eigenratio type estimators: simulations
To better understand the nite sample properties of eigenratio type estimators,
we conduct a series of simulations. For simplicity, we do not use a model with
discrete attacks, as presented in Section 2, but instead use a more standard model
with normally distributed random variables. Let there be J = 4 groups, N = 100
districts, and T = 2000 days. Let there be exactly one group in each district, with
i1  Uniform(0; 1) i.i.d. for i 2 f1; :::; 25g, and no other group present in those
districts. In the same fashion, only Group 2 is present in districts 26-50, only Group
3 in districts 51-75, and only Group 4 in 76-100.
Our simplied model of attacks is that in each period t for each group j, an i.i.d.
draw tj  N(0; 2) is made. The number of attacks is then given by
(18) xit =
X
j
ijtj + uit
where uit  N(0; 1), i.i.d.
We then consider eigenvalues associated with the (N by N) covariance matrix of
attacks. We perform 100000 simulations for each of 2 = 1, 2 = 0:1, 2 = 0:05, and
2 = 0, generating a total of 400000 simulated sample covariance matrices.72
Figures E.1 - E.3 graphically display the results of these simulations. Figure E.1
shows the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. We see that the group structure is
immediately apparent at 2 = 1, still clear at 2 = 0:1, but somewhat unclear at
2 = 0:05. There is no group structure with 2 = 0, and thus Figure E.1d shows the
distribution of eigenvalues under J = 0.
Figure E.2 shows eigenratios, with the leftmost eigenratio being the ratio between
the largest (i.e. leftmost) and second-largest eigenvalues, and so forth. Here, on
average the largest eigenratio clearly corresponds to J = 4 when 2 is large, but this
is no longer the case with 2 = 0:05. Figure E.2d shows that the distribution of
eigenvalues when J = 0 leads to a somewhat peculiar distribution of eigenratios: the
a rate slower than
p
T . The probability of an incorrect selection of k = J + 1 or higher number
of groups would then decrease to zero asymptotically, and the probability of k < J being selected
would similarly decrease.
72Note that in the main text, the choice of 2 = 1 is a normalization, because the fijg are
unknown, and a decrease in the choice of 2 would simply result in higher ^ estimates. In contrast,
in the simulations in this appendix, the distribution of the fijg are given, and thus choosing a
dierent value 2 changes the signal to noise ratio for the attack covariance matrix.
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rst few and last few eigenratios are much larger than the others. Figure E.2d thus
illustrates why it is important to have some maximum number number of possible
groups, Jmax. The eigenratios associated with the very smallest eigenvalues (towards
the right hand side of Figure E.1d) become quite large. With N = 100, and no Jmax,
choosing J^ based on the largest of all the eigenratios would lead to many J^ estimates
of 99 groups. However, as noted in Ahn and Horenstein [2013], any intermediate
choice of Jmax is unlikely to aect the results.
Figure E.3 shows the distribution of estimates J^ with Jmax = 50. Figures E.3a and
E.3b show that the eigenratio approach works very well when the signal to noise ratio
in the covariance matrix is relatively high. Figure E.3c, however, shows that with a
noisier covariance matrix, the estimated values for J^ tend to be too low. Figure E.3d
shows the distribution of estimates of J^ when there is no group structure.
In both of Figures E.3c and E.3d, J^ = 1 is the modal estimate. Figure E.3d
shows that the median estimated J^ is below the true value J = 4 (the mean is above,
but this is less apparent from the gure). However, Figure E.3d shows the case with
no group structure at all, and thus would not change regardless of the true value of
J . The bias of the estimator thus cannot be signed: this is a natural result of J
and J^ both being integers bounded between 0 and 50. Bias correction appears to be
non-trivial.
Figure E.3c provides a possible explanation for why estimates of J^ = 1 appear
so frequently in Table 5. The nite sample properties of eigenratio type estimators
are such that there is a tendency to estimate low values of J^ in cases where the
covariance matrix is noisy. This is due to the distribution of eigenvalues resulting
from the noise, as shown in Figure E.1d. The evidence provided in Table 5 should
thus mainly be taken as an indication that the null hypothesis of no group structure
should be rejected. Figure E.3c shows how estimates J^ = 1 occur frequently when
there is actually a group structure with J > 1.73
73In the empirical literature, \low" estimates for the number of factors (compared to other meth-
ods) are obtained by Choi et al. [2014] and Wu et al. [2011]. Figures E.3b and E.3c appear in line
with results reported (using actual data) in the supplement to Baurle [2013].
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Appendix Figure E.1: Eigenvalues
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(b) 2 = 0:1
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(c) 2 = 0:05
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(d) 2 = 0
Points indicate means over 100000 simulations. Bars show interquartile range.
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Appendix Figure E.2: Eigenratios
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Points indicate means over 100000 simulations. Bars show interquartile range.
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Appendix Figure E.3: Estimated number of groups (J^)
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Histograms of estimated number of groups, over 100000 simulations. True value
J = 4 shown in red.
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F Reference Distributions
We consider three dierent \reference distributions". First, suppose that the
structural model presented in Section 2.1 is correct. In this case, the distribution
of the number of attacks by disorganized militants in district i is the same for all
periods, with expected value `i. Thus, under the null hypothesis that there is no
group structure, the observed attack data is weakly exchangeable: within a given
district, permuting the time indices does not change the joint distribution of the
attacks.74 The total number of such permutations is huge, and thus rather than
perform calculations using the entire set we consider only a random subset of these
permutations. By construction, the permuted data exhibits no group structure: all
the o-diagonal entries of the sample covariance matrix will be zero asymptotically.
To construct the desired reference distribution, we treat each of these permutations
as if it were the observed data.
Now, suppose instead that the structural model assumed is not exactly correct,
and there is some cross-time variation in the expected number of attacks by disor-
ganized militants within a district. Specically, suppose that the probability that
a disorganized militant launches an attack is not a constant , but rather varies
across months. The expected number of attacks on a given day in month m is then
im`i, and will dier by month. In this case, the observed attack data is still weakly
exchangeable, but only within a given district and a given month. We can thus
still construct a reference distribution, provided that observations are permuted only
within each month for each district. In this case, the covariance matrices may not
have all o-diagonal entries zero asymptotically: it could be that im and i0m are
positively correlated, for example.
Finally, suppose that the expected number of attacks by disorganized militants
varies at the daily level, rather than the monthly level. The general case, with it`i
attacks expected in district i at time t, is so general that it does not appear to allow
for any permutations. However, suppose that the number of expected attacks is
instead t`i, where t now does not dier across districts.
75 This might be the case,
74The intuition here can be provided by an example. Suppose there are three periods. If there is
no group structure, then the probability of observing fx1; x2; x3g in a given district must be equal to
the probability of observing fx1; x3; x2g, because the number of attacks is i.i.d. across time within
a given district.
75This gives the disorganized militants the same structure an additional organized group. The test
against the null hypothesis in this case is thus related to whether there is an organized group present
76
for example, if there were particular days that, for whatever reason, generated large
amounts of random violence. In this case, observations are \approximately" weakly
exchangeable via the following sort of permutation, inspired by Good [2002]. Find
a pair of districts i and i0, and a pair of times t and t0, such that the following two
conditions hold: there were the same number of attacks x in district i at time t and
in district i0 at time t0, and there were the same number of attacks x0 in district i at
time t0 and in district i0 at time t. Permute the data by swapping x and x0 in these
four entries.76 These permutations are attractive from an intuitive perspective, as
they retain not only the same number of total attacks in each district, but also the
same number of total attacks on each day. In the Afghan data, there are relatively
few attacks on any given day and thus an enormous number of possible permutations
of this sort. A random sample of these permutations is used.
G Estimation using monthly covariance matrices
Suppose that attack probabilities are relatively small. Then the number of at-
tacks by unorganized militants can be approximated using a Poisson(im`i) dis-
tribution instead of using the actual Binomial(im; `i) distribution. Similarly, the
distribution of attacks by members of an organized group can be approximated with
Poisson(imtjij) in place of Binomial(imtj; ij).
Now, suppose that there are a total of xim attacks in district i. Conditional on
there being a total of xim attacks, the distribution of these attacks across days is given
by a Multinomial(xim; pi) distribution, where pi is a probability vector with elements
that is active in some districts but not others. Under the null hypothesis, the o-diagonal entries of
the sample covariance matrix should be directly proportional to the total number of attacks in the
districts in question.
76To see why this weak exchangeability holds \approximately", note that the distribution of
attacks is binomial. Approximate the binomial with a Poisson distribution with expectation t`i.
Then for observations of the type just described
Pr(xjt`i)Pr(x0jt0`i)Pr(x0jt`i0)Pr(xjt0`i0) = (t`i)
x
x!
e t`i
(t0`i)
x0
x0!
e t0`i
(t`i0)
x0
x0!
e t`i0
(t0`i0)
x
x!
e t0`i0
= Pr(x0jt`i)Pr(xjt0`i)Pr(xjt`i0)Pr(x0jt0`i0)
by rearranging terms. The canonical reference for multivariate permutations appears to be Pesarin
[2001], although this specic type of permutation is not described. Good [2005] provides an accessible
introduction to permutation tests.
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of the form
pit =
`i +
P
j tjijP
t0 (`i +
P
j t0jij)
If in some other district i0 there were xi0m attacks, then the covariance of daily attacks
has the useful form
Cov(xim; xi0m) = ximxi0m
X
t
pitpi0t   xim
T
 xi0m
T
= ximxi0m(
X
t
pitpi0t   1
T
 1
T
)
Cov(xim; xi0m)
ximxi0m
= SCov(pit; pi0t)
where SCov(pit; pi0t) gives the sample covariance for a given draw of . The rst
line of the above holds because each attack decision is independent given both the
total number of attacks and the realization of . If the  are constructed such thatP
t0 t0j = 1, then the denominator in the expression above for pit will simplify such
that
SCov(pit; pi0t) =
P
j iji0j
2
j
(T`i +
P
j ij)(T`i0 +
P
j i0j)
The T`i +
P
j ij term can be taken to be the \average" number of attacks, which
implies that ~ij =
ij
T`i+
P
j ij
is the fraction of attacks in district i that group j will
be responsible for. Then
Cov(pit; pi0t) =
X
j
~ij ~i0j
2
j
Here ~ and 2 are not separately identied. If the normalization 2j = 1 is used, then
the estimated ~ describe relative degrees to which groups are more or less responsible
for attacks, across districts.
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